Nova Southeastern University

NSUWorks
CEC Theses and Dissertations

College of Engineering and Computing

2019

User Information Security Behavior in Professional
Virtual Communities: A Technology Threat
Avoidance Approach
Vivienne Forrester
Nova Southeastern University, vivght@gmail.com

This document is a product of extensive research conducted at the Nova Southeastern University College of
Engineering and Computing. For more information on research and degree programs at the NSU College of
Engineering and Computing, please click here.

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Share Feedback About This Item
NSUWorks Citation
Vivienne Forrester. 2019. User Information Security Behavior in Professional Virtual Communities: A Technology Threat Avoidance
Approach. Doctoral dissertation. Nova Southeastern University. Retrieved from NSUWorks, College of Engineering and Computing.
(1079)
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd/1079.

This Dissertation is brought to you by the College of Engineering and Computing at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in CEC Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

User Information Security Behavior in Professional Virtual Communities:
A Technology Threat Avoidance Approach

by
Vivienne V. Forrester

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in
Information Systems
College of Engineering and Computing
Nova Southeastern University
2019

Approval/Signature Page

Abstract
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Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
User Information Security Behavior in Professional Virtual Communities: A Technology
Threat Avoidance Approach
by
Vivienne V. Forrester
April 2019
The popularization of professional virtual communities (PVCs) as a platform for people
to share experiences and knowledge has produced a paradox of convenience versus
security. The desire to communicate results in disclosure where users experience ongoing
professional and social interaction. Excessive disclosure and unsecured user security
behavior in PVCs increase users’ vulnerability to technology threats. Nefarious entities
frequently use PVCs such as LinkedIn to launch digital attacks. Hence, users are faced
with a gamut of technology threats that may cause harm to professional and personal
lives. Few studies, however, have examined users’ information security behavior and
their motivation to engage in technology threat avoidance behavior in a PVC.
This study tested a professional virtual community technology threat avoidance model
empirically. The model was developed from the conceptualization of different aspects of
the technology threat avoidance theory, social cognitive theory, and involvement theory
through an integrated approach. This quantitative study employed a random sampling
methodology. Prior to collecting data for the main study an expert panel review and a
pilot study were conducted. A web-based survey designed with a 5-point Likert scale was
distributed to 1285 LinkedIn members to gather self-reported data on users’ technology
threat avoidance behavior. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation
modeling (SEM) were used to analyze the data gathered from 380 respondents.
The results of the data analysis revealed that perceived susceptibility, perceived severity,
and information security knowledge sharing are strong predictors of avoidance
motivation. Information security knowledge sharing had the most significant predicting
effect on avoidance motivation in PVCs. Also, self-efficacy, group norms, and avoidance
motivation all have a significant predicting effect on users’ information security
avoidance behavior in PVCs. However, information security experience and safeguarding
measure cost do not have a significant predicting effect on users’ information security
avoidance motivation. This study makes significant contributions to the IS body of
knowledge and has implications for practitioners and academics. This study offers a
comprehensive model through the integration of behavioral and cognitive theories to
better understand user information security behavior in PVCs. The model also identifies
essential elements to motivate users to engage in technology threat avoidance behavior.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Virtual communities (VCs) have received increasing attention as a rising
phenomenon among online users in recent years. Technological advancements in Web
2.0 platforms have contributed to the transformation of online users from passive readers
into content contributors. Users now form and reveal their identity in the digital world, as
they create, distribute, redistribute, and exchange information (Gritzalis, Kandias,
Stavrou, & Mitrou, 2014). Also, with the increased virtualization of organizations, work
has transcended physical boundaries as employees can work from virtual offices
(Arachchilage & Love, 2014).
Hagel and Armstrong (1997, p. 143) defined VCs as “computer-mediated spaces
where there is a potential for the integration of content and communication with an
emphasis on member-generated content.” A professional virtual community (PVC) refers
to a human-centric entity, which has been designed to maximize the realization of
knowledge workers and to best support innovation within a virtual environment (Bifulco,
& Santoro, 2005). Dudezert, Heibült, and Boughzala (2006) asserted that PVCs provide a
context for professionals to share their knowledge and build skills without geographical
constraints. Hence, PVCs are constant online spaces, where users experience ongoing
professional and social interaction (Søraker, 2011). As a continuous online space, the use
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of PVCs for business and social activities has become a fundamental element of financial
growth and opportunity (Prieger, 2013; Shillair et al., 2015).
However, along with the conveniences of using computers and the internet, users
are faced with a gamut of technology threats. Users experience threats associated with a
data breach, malware, ransomware, identify theft, and phishing attacks, which may cause
severe harm to professional and personal lives (Microsoft, 2014; Rainie Kiesler, Kang, &
Madden, 2013). According to the Symantec (2017) Internet security threat report,
ransomware spiraled worldwide in 2016, with 100 new malware families released and a
36% increase in ransomware attacks. The growth in technology threats has resulted in an
increased need for users to undertake technology threat avoidance behaviors.
Nevertheless, while internet users may use basic, built-in system security settings such as
antivirus software, firewall, and automatic updates to maintain their security, three in five
people believe they cannot be completely anonymous online and are increasingly worried
about privacy (Rainie et al., 2013). A user’s sense of safety and security is critical in
PVCs as users are expected to share information.
PVCs increase the flow of information on a platform designed for creating,
sharing and transferring knowledge, as users become addicted to sharing their personal
information to a broader range of friends (Zhao et al., 2012). However, this “free-flow”
sharing of information is sometimes detrimental to the users (Hung & Cheng, 2013). As a
result, Zhang and Gupta (2016, p. 2) indicated that user-generated content ecosystem in
VCs often “suffers from data interception, information fraudulence, privacy spying, and
copyright infringement from disorganized social, organizational forms and non-friendly
participation bodies.”
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Furthermore, the rapid growth in popularity of PVC has attracted the unwanted
attention of both hackers and organized crime. While hackers create havoc,
cybercriminals exploit PVC using them for fraud and other illegal activities, including
data mining and spear phishing. At a recent DefCon security conference, a group of
social engineering hackers attempted to trick employees from more than a dozen major
corporations including Apple, AT&T, and United Airlines into disclosing sensitive
corporate information on LinkedIn (Crowley, 2012). Some people divulged specific
technical details about their employer’s infrastructure, while others revealed information
that could be used for stealth attacks. Security is a significant concern and is of utmost
importance as LinkedIn has over 500 million registered users globally. LinkedIn is a
professional virtual community, offering business and employment-oriented service to its
users. As a website and mobile app operated service, LinkedIn provides a platform where
employers post jobs and job seekers post their resumes, search for jobs, find connections,
and make and receive recommendations from other users. LinkedIn provides information
on approximately 10 million careers and 9 million companies, in over 200
countries (Darrow, 2017).
Different from other social networks such as Instagram, Facebook, and Snapchat
that is more recreational, LinkedIn emphasizes a user’s professional connection. Users
create profile pages structured like a resume, recapitulate their career, promote their
skills, their education, and employment history (Zide, Elman, & Shahani-Denning, 2014).
LinkedIn user-connection structure employs a "gated-access approach” where building
connections require an existing relationship or an introduction through a current contact.
This approach is envisioned to build trust among members. However, while users are
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generously providing data via user profiles, they are faced with a paradox of increasing
security risk to their data. Since 2015, LinkedIn generates most of its revenue from
recruitment services, selling access to members information to professional recruiters and
employers (Ara & Ara, 2015; Lemann, 2015). LinkedIn has also been criticized for not
taking appropriate measures to secure users’ information (Paul, 2012).

Problem Statement
Professional virtual communities (PVC) are targets for cyber attacks. Specifically,
nefarious entities frequently use LinkedIn to launch digital attacks. Nevertheless, users
continue to participate in unsafe computing practices in VCs (Microsoft, 2014). Several
studies have investigated user information security behavior towards security threats.
However, previous studies focused more on understanding the home computer usage and
compliance in organizations and their associated security risks (Arachchilage & Love,
2014; Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Li & Siponen, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010).
While in general information security threats in social media is acknowledged, the
literature is lacking in studies that consider security threats targeted to PVCs. This study
is an attempt to fill the gap in the information security (IS) literature by investigating user
security behavior in PVCs and how to motivate individual users to engage in technology
threats avoidance behavior, through an integrated approach.
This study was motivated by a growth in the popularity of PVCs, particularly,
LinkedIn and the rising number of security threats in recent years. According to Huh,
Kim, Rayala, Bobba, and Beznosov (2017) most of today’s IS attacks are not concerned
with only circumventing the authentication process of an individual (as in the case of

5
home computer usage) or even an organization, they are more inclined to access
confidential information on a larger scale, such as through a PVC. Also, social media
differs in its functionality and architecture. The LinkedIn community focuses on
professional, work-related life (Utz, 2016). Samtani, Chinn, Chen, and Nunamaker
(2017) pointed out that PVCs present unique security threats and are considered “gold
mines” for hackers, as they have a considerable amount of confidential and strategic
information that spans many organizations in a single location. Huh, et al. (2017) also
indicated that beyond and above other social media such as Facebook and Twitter,
LinkedIn has vital information that bad actors can use to attack nearly any organization
and its corporate data in over two hundred countries. These scenarios highlight the
importance of examining user information security behavior in PVCs, primarily due to
the potential wide-scale repercussions to individuals, organizations, and even countries,
that may result from a lack of user security actions in PVCs. Furthermore, Zhang and
Gupta (2016) indicated that the security and trustworthiness issues of PVCs have become
increasingly severe and issued a call for urgent research and attention to the phenomena.

Dissertation Goal
The goal of this study was to investigate the avoidance motivation factors that
influence users’ information security behavior in professional virtual communities. To
address the lack of research on user security behaviors in PVCs from both a personal
and collaborative approach, this study integrated constructs from the involvement theory
and social cognitive theory into the threat avoidance theory to explain user information
security behavior in PVCs. This study developed a conceptual model to investigate how
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individual computer users in professional virtual communities avoid technology threats in
an integrated approach based on constructs from the technology threat avoidance theory
(TTAT), involvement theory, and social cognitive theory (SCT).
Drawing on the involvement theory (Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2004), this study examined
how personal experiences with security threats, privacy breaches, and coping measures,
coupled with sharing of security knowledge within professional virtual communities can
enhance users’ self-confidence to engage in technology threat avoidance behavior
ultimately. The study contributes to knowledge on computers and security by proposing
an integrated theoretical information security user model which identifies predictors of
users’ information security behavior in PVCs.

Research Questions
This study addressed the following research questions:
1. How do factors from technology threat avoidance theory and involvement theory
predict individual computer users’ technology threat avoidance motivation in
professional virtual communities?
2. How do self-efficacy, “group norms,” and avoidance motivation safeguards
predict users’ avoidance security behavior in professional virtual communities?

Relevance and Significance
There has been a continuous request for research on user information security
behaviors (Crossler et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). There is an increased
number of studies that have focused on examining users’ intention to perform
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information security behaviors (e.g., (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Herath & Rao,
2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lee et al., 2008; Vance et al., 2012)) within recent
years. However, there is a gap in the field that requires attention. There is a lack of
research that investigates the emerging security threats in PVCs and users’ information
security behavior towards the associated threats, especially as an integrated approach.
The increasing use of PVCs and adoption of online user policies suggest that even
security mistakes in a PVC may affect other public places’ online safety. The lack of
security action of an individual can cause other members of the PVC as well as several
organizations to face cyber-threats (Tsi et al., 2016). Hence, it is imperative to address
technology threat avoidance from both a personal and collaborative approach.
Additionally, the extant literature on professional virtual communities focuses on
knowledge sharing, eLearning, or health practices. Also, several studies focused on basic
security threats in home computers and organizations. For instance, Dang-Pham and
Pittayachawan (2015) investigated the factors that contributed to malware avoidance
behaviors of security threats in multiple contexts and compared the impact of behavioral
intentions specifically in mobile devices at home and in a BYOD enabled institution.
They found that behavioral intention to execute malware avoidance behaviors varies
across the contexts. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) also found that perceptions of
self-efficacy and vulnerability have different impacts on malware avoidance.
Additionally, Crossler, Bélanger, and Ormond (2017) indicated that online
security threats must be examined from a holistic approach to include adopting multiple
actions for self-protection. As the characteristics and security threats associated with
PVCs are different from home computer usages and organizations, it is critical to
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understand the diverse approach that is necessary for user information security behavior
in PVCs.
Moreover, according to Zheleva and Getoor (2009) to address privacy concerns
and to prevent personal information leakage, users must be cognizant of the methods an
adversary can use to attack a VC to gain access to users’ private attributes. Prior
experience with technology threat avoidance theory, involvement theory, and social
cognitive theory have not been previously considered as a comprehensive framework for
individual computer users’ technology threat avoidance. This study contributes to
research on computers and security by examining technology threat avoidance behavior
from both a personal and collaborative approach through an integrated model. The model
(PVCTTAM) integrated new motivational factors for technology threat avoidance:
information security knowledge sharing and information security experience, with group
norms into the TTAT model to examine the cognitive coping processes as users engage in
technology threat avoidance behavior in protecting against technology threats in PVCs.

Barriers and Issues
This study used a web-based survey approach to collect quantitative data from
respondents who are adult members of the LinkedIn professional virtual community.
Critical barriers in this approach include achieving the target sample size, the willingness
of target respondents to participate in the study, and the generalizability of the study.
Acquiring a suitable sample for a study can be challenging. Hence, the target respondents
were identified through professional connections, professional networks, and LinkedIn.
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Respondents were also encouraged to share the survey with their professional networks,
using the social media share icons embedded on the thank-you page.
The participants were selected randomly from the population of LinkedIn
members. This method provides a better representation of the target population than
using a convenient sample (Son & Kim, 2008). Additionally, examining security
behavior in a community can be difficult, as security concerns may vary from individual
or professional group to another. Furthermore, this study focusses on LinkedIn individual
users as participants. Hence some aspects of the study may not apply to other social
network users.

Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations
The primary statistical methods used to analyze the results and to assess the
reliability and validity of the study include a multivariate statistical method of
Cronbach’s Alpha, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and structural equation modeling
(SEM). Therefore, the assumptions and limitations of these approaches also apply to this
research. SEM maintains several assumptions which should be met to guarantee reliable
results. These assumptions include reasonable sample size, continuously and normally
distributed endogenous variables, model identification of known correlations or
covariances input, complete data, and theoretical basis for model specification and
causality (Kline, 2012).
The survey explores user information security behavior. Many of the measures,
including perceived susceptibility and perceived severity, are not detectable from
behavioral data such as server logs. Instead, the primary data collected for this study is
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self-reported data, which may be subjected to common method bias. However, the singlefactor common method tests indicate that the common method bias does not pose a threat
to the findings of this study(Podsakoff et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2003). Furthermore,
actual behaviors are challenging to study in the security context (Vroom & von Solms,
2004).
However, based on behavioral theories such as theory of planned behavior (TBA)
and theory of reasoned action (TRA), there is a consistent and robust relationship
between intentions and actual behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003) as illustrated in Sheeran’s
(2002) correlational tests of intention-behavior consistency, as well as meta-analytic tests
conducted based on experimental studies examining the impact of changing subject. The
survey was administered to a subset of LinkedIn members. The sample demographics
was a close representation of the population of LinkedIn members; hence, this study
serves as an adequate representation of professional virtual community users.

Summary
Human beings “distinctive genius” rely on communication with others. This
inherent desire to communicate often takes the form of disclosure (Millham & Atkins,
2018). Technological advancements in Web 2.0 interactive tools have contributed to the
transformation of professional virtual communities (PVC). PVCs provide a platform for
individuals to share experiences and knowledge (Zhao, Lu, Wang, Chau, & Zhang,
2012). As, a result, PVCs such as LinkedIn have continued to increase in both popularity
and influence. However, as the usage of the Internet and PVCs increases, the security and
privacy risks to users have also increased. Based on the behavioral theories including
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technology threat avoidance theory, social cognitive theory, and involvement theory, this
research focusses on the potential of professional virtual communities (PVC) to disrupt
existing privacy and security boundaries while encouraging and facilitating information
sharing among community members.
Based on the security risks and the increased use of PVCs, it is essential to
examine how individuals with high regards for their personal information choose to
disclose specific credentials publicly. To provide a clear understanding of PVC user
information security threat avoidance behaviors, it is useful to explore the security
elements that affect personal sharing, the role of the user information security knowledge
and experience in relation to technology threat avoidance behavior in PVCs, and the
avoidance motivation factors that influence users’ technology threat avoidance behavior
in PVCs. This study drew on the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT),
involvement theory, and the social cognitive theory (SCT), to explain how personal
experiences with privacy breaches, security threats, and coping measures can enhance
users’ self-confidence to engage in technology threat avoidance behavior ultimately.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Overview
This study focuses on PVC users’ ability and willingness to adopt avoidance
motivation and ultimately avoidance behavior for implementing computer security
measures to protect their accounts. A key issue of professional virtual community users is
understanding information security and how to attain a reasonable level of security for
their LinkedIn account. As technologies like the web, the cloud, and specifically PVCs
become more integrated into standard social and business practices; concerns are
increasing that data breaches are occurring more frequently. Herath and Rao (2009)
indicated that users view policies, particularly those involving information security as
mere guidelines or general directions to follow rather than hard and fast rules that require
compliance. Therefore, enforcement of security in PVCs is challenging. As a result, many
PVC users continue to experience multiple security attacks. Pesce, Casas, Rauber, and
Almeida (2012) reported that exposure of date and place of birth of a PVC user’s profile
could be used to predict the social security number (SSN) of a United States citizen,
potentially leading to identity theft.
As the advancement of PVC translates to economic opportunities, the importance
of information will also increase. Understanding user information security behavior and
developing security protection models will assist PVC users in strengthening information
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security through tools and methods. This study will develop a model, the professional
virtual community technology threat avoidance model, grounded in the technology threat
avoidance theory, involvement theory, and social cognitive theory.
Technology threat avoidance theory embedded in cybernetic theory and
represented by a cybernetic process is a broad-based theory that explains why and how
individual IT users engage in threat avoidance behaviors. This study employed the TTAT
as a framework to provide a basis for PVC users motivation and avoidance behavior in
adopting security safeguarding measures. The involvement theory rooted in marketing
and education examines the impacts of user security knowledge sharing and experiences
on PVC user’s motivation to adopt security measures. The social cognitive theory is
grounded in psychology. Bandua (1986) developed SCT to understand and predict both
individual and group behavior and to identify how to amend or change behavior. The
study employed SCT to examine how group norms as a concept of observational learning
influence PVC user’s information security behavior.

Theory Development
Based on the existing literature, there is a discrepancy between individual
computer users realizing that there is a technology threat and how and when users adopt
avoidance motivation actions against such a threat. Also, the gap between the avoidance
motivation factors which influence users’ information security avoidance behavior and
actual users’ information security avoidance behavior in PVCs is not adequately
explained by the existing literature. The researcher will attempt to close this gap in the
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information systems and information security literature by developing the professional
virtual community technology threat avoidance model (PVCTTAM).
The proposed conceptual model uses technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT),
involvement theory, and the social cognitive theory (SCT) to understand what motivates
online safety behaviors in the context of PVCs. Individual computer users do not have
formal organizational compliance security controls (Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila,
2014). Hence, other methods of controls are needed for their threat avoidance behavior.
Prior research suggested the development of a community of practice, knowledge
sharing, and repeated training and security awareness to build users’ confidence in their
abilities to manage technology threats (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015).
This study, therefore, integrated the construct of group norms, knowledge sharing
and, experience with safeguarding measure cost, self-efficacy, perceived susceptibility,
and perceived severity into the TTAT model to further examine cognitive and
collaborative strategies that can motivate individual users to engage in technology threat
avoidance behaviors in virtual communities. The researcher extended these dimensions of
the three theories in the context of information security. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed
conceptual model.
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Figure 1: Professional virtual community technology threat avoidance model
(PVCTTAM)

Approaches to Avoidance Motivation and Behavior Avoidance
Avoidance motivation is defined as “the degree to which IT users are motivated to
avoid IT threats by taking safeguarding measures (Liang & Xue, 2009, p. 84). One of the
barriers to avoidance motivation is the complexities of protective behavior and practices
(Hoban, Rader, Wash, & Vaniea, 2014). According to Zheleva and Getoor (2009) to
address privacy concerns and to prevent personal information leakage, users must be
cognizant of the methods an adversary can use to attack a PVC to gain access to users’
private attributes. Motivation behavior is influenced by safeguarding measure cost, which
is payback for engaging in motivation behavior, including physical and cognitive efforts
such as time, money, and understanding to use security protection measures (Liang &
Xue, 2009; Weinstein, 1993). These efforts often create behavioral barriers and reduce
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the motivation to engage in information security avoidance behavior due to the costbenefit analysis. If the costs to mitigate the threat are perceived to be high in comparison
to the benefits, individuals are less likely to adopt security avoidance behavior. Hence,
the higher the safeguarding cost to protect from technology threats, the less likely users
will engage in avoidance motivation, therefore the hypothesis:
H1: Safeguarding measure cost to protect against technology threats is negatively
related to avoidance motivation.
Liang and Xue (2010, p. 397) defined perceived susceptibility as an “individual’s
subjective probability that a malicious IT will negatively affect him or her”, while
perceived severity is defined as “the extent to which an individual perceives that negative
consequences caused by a malicious IT will be severe” (Liang & Xue, 2010, p. 397).
Perceived susceptibility and perceived severity are combined to form a perceived threat
(Witte, 1992), which may influence how users process security threats and how
motivated they are to engage in a behavior. If perceived susceptibility and perceived
severity are determined to be high, then a user will engage in a coping mechanism
(avoidance). According to Ng, Kankanhalli, and Xu (2009), when users are conscious of
the susceptibility and severity of the malicious threats, they can make informed decisions
to execute preventative behavior, hence the hypotheses:
H2: Perceived susceptibility of being attacked by malicious technology threats is
positively related to avoidance motivation.
H3: Perceived severity of being attacked by malicious technology threats is
positively related to avoidance motivation.
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Flores et al. (2014) described information security knowledge sharing as the
interaction between users by sharing experiences, ideas, and knowledge to safeguard
information assets. Information security knowledge sharing is an effective method to
increase the level of awareness, and it is a sign of information security involvement (Safa
et al., 2016). Arachchilage and Love’s (2014) study indicates that users’ knowledge
avoids phishing threats. According to Ben-Asher and Gonzalez (2015), information
knowledge sharing can significantly alleviate the risk of information security threats.
Information security knowledge sharing also assists in reducing time and resources spent
on developing appropriate security measures (Feledi et al., 2013) by preventing the
duplication of the same solutions for similar security threats. Additionally, Safa et al.
(2016) further highlighted the importance of sharing security knowledge not only to
increase security awareness, which is a motivating factor for behavior performance
(Abawajy, 2014) but also reduces the cost of information security in organizations, hence
the hypothesis:
H4: Information security knowledge sharing is positively related to users’
avoidance motivation.
Experience is defined as knowledge or mastery, resulting in awareness, ability,
skill, and understanding of a concept through exposure or involvement. Information
security experience refers to knowledge of and familiarity with information security
breaches, skills, and the ability to prevent, manage, and mitigate information security
risks (Safa et al., 2016). Ashenden (2008) found that experience is an essential aspect of
information security management. Safa et al. (2016) established that the concept of
information security knowledge and experience is the central problem for users in
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information security. They indicated that knowledge and experience assist in generating
appropriate behavior in dynamic environments, therefore the hypothesis:
H5: Information security experience is positively related to users’ avoidance
motivation.
According to Shillair et al. (2015), studies of employee online safety behaviors
indicate that social norms are determining factors for online safety practices. Consistent
with SCT, group norms are indicators of how users will accept responsibility to engage in
specific behaviors. Dholakia, Bagozzi, and Pearo (2004, p. 245) defined group norms as
“an understanding of, and a commitment by, the individual member to a set of goals,
values, beliefs, and conventions shared with other group members.” Dholakia et al.
(2004) further indicated that Group norms are especially significant for virtual
communities as they are conceivably the most readily accessible components of grouprelated information obtainable in many communities and regulating exchanges among
members over time (Alon et al., 2004). Ajzen (1991, p. 185) posited that an “individual’s
perception of acceptable group norms drives the intention to engage in a specific
behavior.”
Past studies show that group norms in online communities have powerful and
consistent influences on members’ attitudes and behaviors (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Terry &
Hogg, 1996; Zeng, Huang, & Dou, 2009). In the case of online safety, if users believe it
is the norm for individuals to take responsibility and if they have the confidence to
perform security protection tasks, they will be more motivated to perform the necessary
functions (Douba et al., 2014). On the contrary, if users believe it is the group norm to
rely on external factors such as their ISP, operating system manufacturer, or Internet
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browser makers, they will be less motivated to perform security protection behavior
(Shillair et al., 2015), hence the hypothesis:
H6: Group norms is positively related to technology threat avoidance behavior.
According to Arachchilage and Love (2014), many internet users are not
confident in their ability to protect themselves online; this confidence refers to selfefficacy. In the context of security, Liang and Xue (2010) defined self-efficacy as
individuals’ confidence in taking safeguarding measures to protect against technology
threats. Prior studies indicate that individuals are more motivated to engage in technology
security behavior as their self-efficacy rise (Liang & Xue, 2010; Kaiser, 1974; Ng,
Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009; Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005). According to Bandura (1989),
individuals with low self-efficacy are inclined to avoid challenging tasks. These users are
considered passive users. High self-efficacy individuals are more active problem-solvers,
as they act from their self-perceived ability to accomplish tasks effectively. Additionally,
Shillair et al. (2015) suggested that higher self-efficacy increases the likelihood of the
users engaging in protective behavior, thus the hypothesis:
H7: Self-efficacy to protect against technology threats is positively related to
avoidance behavior.
Avoidance behavior refers to actual behavior (Liang & Xue, 2010). The
relationship between motivation and action was long established in psychology and
organization research. According to cognitive theorists (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), behavioral intention is a great predictor of actual
behavior, and behavior intention is synonymous with avoidance motivation. This concept
was supported by the law of effect (Thorndike, 1911), which indicates that human beings
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are motivated to repeat past actions that lead to positive outcomes and reduce past actions
that produce adverse outcomes. Steers, Mowday, and Shapiro (2004) also found that
individuals are more likely to act when they are motivated. Consistent with TTAT (Liang
& Xue, 2009), in the context of IT threat, users’ technology threat avoidance behavior is
influenced by avoidance motivation. Hence, following previous studies, this study
predicts that users who have strong avoidance motivation are more likely to engage in
avoidance behavior against technology threats, therefore the hypothesis:
H8: Avoidance motivation is positively related to avoidance behavior to protect against
technology threats using the safeguarding measures.

Theoretical Background
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory
Liang and Xue (2009) developed the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT)
to explain individual IT user’s threat avoidance behavior. TTAT was developed through a
synthesis of literature from various disciplines, including psychology, health care, risk
analysis, and information systems. Grounded in the cybernetic theory (Carver & Scheier,
1982; Edwards, 1992), TTAT postulates that users’ IT threat avoidance is reflective of a
closed feedback loop, where users try to extend the gap between their current security
state and the unsafe end state. The foundation of TTAT is that when users perceive the
existence of an IT threat, it motivates them to actively avoid the threat by utilizing a
safeguarding measure (a problem-focused coping measure) if they consider that the
safeguarding measure can circumvent the threat. However, if the user believes the threat
is not avoidable by any safeguarding measures accessible to them, they will employ
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emotion-focused coping measures to passively avoid the threat (Liang & Xue, 2009).
This process theory view, as illustrated in Figure 2 explains the coping appraisal process.
The authors developed the process theory view to test TTAT as process research.

Figure 2: The process theory view of the TTAT (Liang & Xue, 2009)
Drawing on the research of risk analysis (Baskerville, 1991a; Baskerville, 1991b)
and health psychology (Janz & Becker, 1984; Rogers, 1983; Weinstein, 2000), TTAT
also theorizes that the perceived likelihood determines users' threat perceptions that a
threat will occur and the perceived severity of the threat’s negative consequences (Liang
& Xue, 2010). The theory elucidates the approach-avoidance discrepancy, signifying that
the avoidance of a malicious threat is not the same as taking a safeguarding measure. The
approach-avoidance model assumes that avoidance and adoption behaviors are ultimately
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different. The authors introduced core constructs to fully comprehend threat appraisal,
coping appraisal, and coping, as described by the variance theory view in Figure 3.

Figure 3: The variance theory view of TTAT (Liang & Xue, 2009)

While most theories addressing information security focus is on an organizational
level, TTAT provides a framework that describes the factors that influence individual
users’ IT threat avoidance behavior. According to Liang and Wang (2009), TTAT has the
potential to support IT professionals in raising security awareness to design effective
mechanisms to educate employees about IT threats. This study focuses on the
professional virtual community, LinkedIn users’ information security behavior with
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individuals as the unit of analysis and apply TTAT constructs and concepts to develop a
user information security model to guide PVC users’ security behavior.
This study adopted the core constructs of self-efficacy, safeguarding measure
cost, perceived susceptibility, and perceived severity from the TTAT theory. Consistent
with TTAT, users’ IT Threat avoidance behavior is determined by avoidance motivation,
which is influenced by perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, safeguarding measure
cost, and self-efficacy. Safeguarding cost is the physical and cognitive efforts, including
time, money, and inconvenience required to engage in avoidance motivation (Liang &
Xue, 2009). Self-efficacy refers to users perceived ability to perform a given task
(Bandura, 2000) in the context of information security, self- efficacy is defined as one’s
ability to take the appropriate measures to protect self against IT threats effectively (Ling
& Xue, 2009).
The belief that an individual can execute a behavior is an essential construct in IS;
adopted from social psychology. Several studies indicated that self-efficacy influences an
individual’s ability to engage in a task in the context of clinical, managerial, and
computer usage. Self-efficacy beliefs influence decisions about what behaviors to
undertake (e.g., Bandura, et al., 1977; Betz & Hackett, 1981), computer usage and its
relationship between self-efficacy computer behaviors (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990;
Campeau & Higgins, 1995), computer game usage (Bergey, Ketelhut, Liang, Natarajan,
& Karakus (2015) and internet usage (Wang, Jackson, Wang, & Gaskin, 2015). These
studies argued the need for further research to fully understand the impact of self-efficacy
on users’ information security behavior in online environments.
The TTAT theory is widely used in the IS literature and has demonstrated validity
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TTAT identifies many of the issues that the professional virtual community framework
needs to address. The proposed PVC model attempts to develop threat perceptions such
that PVC users will be more motivated to avoid IT threats and use safeguarding
measures. A vital aspect of this process is that PVC users comprehend the efficiency of
safeguarding measures, lower safeguard costs, and increase self-efficacy. However, there
is a recognition that additional variables are needed to explain user information security
behavior in virtual communities fully. Hence, this study integrated other variables from
the social cognitive theory and the involvement theory.
Involvement Theory
The involvement theory discusses the amount and level of energy, time, and
participation spent engaged in an activity (Lee, Lee & Yoo, 2004). Witmer and Singer
(1998, p. 227) defined involvement as “a psychological state experienced as a
consequence of focusing one’s energy and attention on a coherent set of stimuli or
meaningfully related activities and events.” The concept of involvement was initially
linked to learning, advertising, and consumer behavior. According to Olshavsky and
Granbois (1979), the average consumer makes several routine decisions daily without an
all-embracing search for information or comprehensive evaluation of the choice
alternatives. As a result, theorists began to view consumer behavior as a two-fold
dichotomy: low involvement consumer behavior and high involvement consumer
behavior (Engel & Blackwell 1982). Zaichkowsky (1986) further conceptualized
involvement as having an impact on behavioral decisions and posited that in the
consumer behavior/marketing domain, involvement is an important factor with purchase
decisions or the "act" of purchase.
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The involvement theory evolved and became applicable to online security
behavior. Flores, Antonsen, and Ekstedt (2014) posited that the lack of security
awareness or knowledge among users is an indicator of a low level of information
security involvement. According to Safa et al. (2016), information security knowledge
sharing represents the level of effort, participation, and time that users engage in security
activities. Safa et al. (2016) further revealed that the level of effort, participation, and
time users spend on information security knowledge sharing and building their
experiences reflect various forms of involvement. Hence, involvement may affect users’
attitude to engage in security tasks.
The involvement theory has garnered significant attention in behavioral
researches, such as social psychology, marketing, and advertising domains and has been
applied extensively in student involvement, customer involvement, and product
involvement (Huang, Chou, & Lin, 2010; Safa et al., 2016). In behavioral consumer
research, Dholakia (1998) and Poiesz and Cees (1995) argued that involvement plays a
significant role in moderating and explaining variable relationships, while Zaichkowsky
(1986) indicated that the extent of involvement impacts a series of behavioral decisions.
Additionally, the analysis of the involvement conceptual and methodological perspectives
model (Houston & Rothschild, 1978), the involvement conceptualizing model
(Zaichkowsky, 1986), and the involvement conceptualizing & measuring model
(Andrews, Durvasula, & Akhter, 1990) predicted the use of involvement concepts on
consumer behavior.
The core constructs of the involvement theory are information security knowledge
sharing and information security experience. Safa et al. (2016, p. 73) defined information
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security experience as “the familiarity with information security incidents, skills and the
ability to prevent, manage, and mitigate the risk of information security events.
According to Albrechtsen (2007), the lack of information security knowledge is the main
issue concerning the role of users in information security. Information security
experience leads to familiarity, mindfulness, understanding, as well as the ability and
skill to manage incidents (Safa et al., 2015) and create appropriate behavior in the real
environment. These studies, however, focused on information security experience
generally to users on the Internet. This study targeted the construct to a PVC which is
dynamic but also has a level of constancy based on the structure of developing trust
through membership and connections.
Information security knowledge sharing has been noted as a predictor of users’
involvement in their security behavior (Flores et al., 2014). Dang-Pham and
Pittayachawan (2015) also recommended knowledge sharing to build users’ confidence to
manage technology threats. Kokolakis (2017) in his study on a review of the privacy
paradox phenomenon, indicates that users’ attitudes and behavior regarding their online
disclosures, privacy, and security evaluations reveal a multifaceted, symbiotic
relationship. Millhan and Atkins (2016) posited that disclosure often takes the form of
knowledge sharing. Knowledge is the understanding of a subject, fact, or information,
acquired through education or experience (Safa et al., 2016).
Therefore, knowledge sharing assists users through collaboration to solve
problems, develop new ideas, and or establish policies or procedures (Wang & Noe,
2010). Lee, Lee, and Sanford (2011) indicated that knowledge sharing is essential to
decision making, risk mitigation, and cost reduction. The complex nature of threat

27
avoidance reduces users’ ability to be fully equipped with the knowledge to perform
security tasks (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Hui, 2007).
Social Cognitive Theory
The social cognitive theory (SCT) is formerly known as the social learning theory
(Bandura, 1986). SCT originated in the areas of psychology and communication and is a
generally accepted, empirically validated model for understanding, predicting, and
modifying human behavior in the context of both individual and groups. SCT postulates
that human behavior is a dynamic relationship, where cognitive factors and
environmental influences interact with behavioral factors (Bandura, 1986, 1991, 1997).
SCT is used in IS to understand user computer behavior (Shillair et al., 2015; Cho, Lee,
& Chung, 2010; Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008; Yi &
Im, 2004).
SCT recognizes the value of learning through experiences (Bandura, 1991). A
person's beliefs impact the interaction between the person and behavioral factors and
actions. Hence the person has some amount of control over their actions. The interaction
between the individual and the environment involves human beliefs and cognition,
influenced by social constructs and structures within the environment. The interaction
between the environment and behavior comprises a person selecting their environment
while their environment alters their behavior. According to Anderson and Agarwal
(2010), learning through observation and vicarious experiences assists users in building
confidence and self-efficacy. The SCT schematic diagram in Figure 4 illustrates the
interaction between the person, environment, and behavior.
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Figure 4: Schematic diagram of the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986)

Social influence refers to a general view of how others influence an individual's
behavior in his or her environment (Liang & Xue, 2010). Johnston and Warkentin (2010)
equate social influences on social norms, a perception of how others are behaving. Social
norms of a community are operationalized as group norms. Group norms are especially
significant for PVCs as they are arguably the most available interaction element, such as
through FAQs or inferable (as in the case of previous interactions) elements of grouprelated information available in many communities (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000). This
concept was supported by Nissenbaum (2009, p. 127) who explained that the norms that
govern “the flow of personal information in a given context are dependent on the type of
information being shared, the content of the information, the method of communication,
as well as the role of the transmitter and the receiver.”
Prior computer security-related studies examine social influence as a predictor of
user behavior (Culnan & Williams, 2009; Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012; Lowry &
Moody, 2015; Posey et al., 2013; Vance et al., 2013). However, many of these studies
were in the context of organizations. Similarly, subjective norms have been applied to

29
computer security-related studies as a social construct. Subjective norms refer to “an
individual's perceptions of how others who are important to him or her think he/she
should behave” (Conner & Armitage, 1998). As the focus of this study is virtual
communities where users are mainly strangers, social influence in a general sense is more
appropriate. Hence drawing on the SCT, this study modified the social norm construct to
make it more relevant to IS PVC context, in the form of group norms. The researcher
examined group norm as a motivator for technology threat avoidance behavior in a PVC.

Information Security in Professional Virtual Communities
Professional virtual communities such as LinkedIn are designed to encourage and
facilitate information sharing while also having the potential to disrupt existing privacy
and security boundaries. PVC posting norms often the entity itself, encourage the
disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) and personal private information
(PPI) (Zhang & Gupta, 2016). PVCs users are even infrequently willing to forego some
privacy for a tolerable level of danger, in exchange for a reward (Kumar, Saravanakumar,
& Deepa, 2016). This type of disclosure poses a considerable risk to the user, threaten
users’ security and trust over the network, often leading to data breaches and security
violations (Millham & Atkin, 2016).
As Gritzalis, et al. (2014) indicated, a significant feature of the eco-system of
personal data on PVCs is that the data is available for crawling and analytics, even
without the users’ consent. According to Yeboah-Boateng (2013), the involuntary
psychometric evaluations and exposure of personal data can lead to a “critical
infrastructure,” characterized by a myriad of cyber-security challenges, such as

30
vulnerabilities of confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA). As numerous threat
agents or hackers exploit vulnerabilities, a crisis in a PVC such as LinkedIn with all the
data at risk may affect other areas such as national security, economic profitability or
social well-being (Gritzalis et al., 2014).
Information security is often analyzed and managed based on the CIA triad
(Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale, & Welch, 2001). Confidentiality addresses matters
associated with unauthorized disclosure and limits access to information. Integrity refers
to the assurance of the accuracy, consistency, and trustworthiness of information, as well
as the steps to prevent alteration of the information by unauthorized users. Availability is
the guarantee of ensuring that authorized users have reliable access to information
(Schneier, 2015). Despite the significant impact of CIA for organizations, these concepts
are often more useful for security professionals. They are abstract and less meaningful to
regular users. Safeguarding data confidentiality at times, involves specialized training for
people who have access to personal information. The specialized training typically
includes security risks that may threaten personal information, password-related best
practices, information related to social engineering methods, and possible prevention
strategies (van Schaik, Jansen, Onibokun, Camp, & Kusev, 2018). However, most
LinkedIn users are not privy to such specialized training. Hence they are not familiar with
many security risks factors and how to safeguard against them.
Additionally, information security for LinkedIn users is a significant factor due to
the multiplexity of internet-enabled devices that are used to access the virtual community.
Several of these devices are often unpatched and configured with default or weak
passwords. Moreover, the increasing popularity of accessing PVCs with mobile devices
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has attracted the attention of cyber criminals (McAfee, 2012; Shih et al., 2008). In
comparison to PCs, mobile devices typically have weaker defense capabilities (Zhang,
2011b). Hence, as mobile malware and virus increases in frequency and sophistication,
PVC has become a viral attack vector, causing damages such as information loss, leaking
of user privacy, and information theft (Chiang & Tsaur, 2011). Despite the development
and use of new security practices and techniques to address the security risks in PVCs,
PVC users continue to experience a growing number of technology threats security
incidents primarily caused by accessing PVCs using mobile devices. As highlighted by
He (2013), a clear majority of social media applications for mobile devices do not include
the necessary security safeguard measures to protect user information.

Past Literature
Prior IT security studies have consistently revealed that IT users analyze
perceived susceptibility and perceived severity of adverse consequences to determine the
security behavior of users against malicious IT threats. However, the studies provide
inconsistent results as to whether both constructs always determine security behavior
(Liang & Xue, 2010). Woon et al. (2005) indicated that perceived severity determines
whether individuals take security measures to protect their home wireless network
security. Ng et al. (2009) revealed that perceived susceptibility impacts users’ security
behavior to protect their emails, while Workman et al. (2008) showed that both perceived
susceptibility and perceived threats determined user IT behavior. As the perception of
threat increases, users are more motivated to engage in protection practices. This notion
is evident in the health protective behavior literature (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987;
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Rosenstock, 1974) and similarly in the IT security literature (Arachchilage & Love, 2014;
Liang & Xue, 2009).
Knowledge is the understanding of a subject, fact, or information, acquired
through education or experience (Safa et al., 2016). The norms of PVCs users to
consistently share information provides an innovative platform for their members to
collaborate, solve problems, develop new ideas, and or establish policies or procedures
(Wang & Noe, 2010). Marwick and Boyd’s (2014) study specified that it is challenging
to meaningfully control the flow of information in a networked space where content is
accessible and persistent. Managing information flow is more difficult as while users may
regulate what they share on their profiles using different privacy settings, they cannot
control what their friends share or what they post about them.
PVC users are continually faced with the trade-off between the perceived benefits,
the desires to fully engage, connect with professionals, and job search in the virtual world
on the one hand and the privacy and security infringement that results from sharing on
the other, a concept Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) described as a paradox.
Furthermore, Norberg et al. (2007) indicated that while users express significant concerns
about their data, they are less than selective in the protection of their data profiles. They
“often willingly, even eagerly, part with intimate details of their lives” (O’Harrow, 2005,
p.54).
According to Such and Rovatsos (2016), PVCs’ privacy and security controls are
challenging to understand, require time-consuming manual configuration, and do not
allow for appropriate management. Also, users must set various security controls,
consider many accessors, and perform fine-grained modifications for many items. As a
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result, many users are not capable of managing the complexity of security management in
PVCs. Lack of security control also leads to multiple data breaches and security
violations (Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014).
PVCs users cannot be entirely anonymous. With sophisticated “re-identification”
algorithms, de-identified data can be easily re-identified. As highlighted by Narayanan
and Shmatikov (2010, p. 26) “the versatility and power of re-identification algorithms
imply that terms such as ‘personally identifiable’ and ‘quasi-identifier’ merely have no
technical meaning.” Hence, users have little or no legal protection for the information
they self-disclose (Dhami, Agarwal, Chakraborty, Singh, & Minj, 2013). Individual
computer users do not have formal organizational compliance controls (Siponen et al.,
2014). Therefore, individual IT users require other methods of controls for their threat
avoidance behavior. However, no comprehensive model within the current literature
provides a precise mechanism for Internet users to adhere to PVC security policies.
The concept of security control is more critical as industries such as healthcare,
financial, and retail engage in web delivery and services, as well as increase levels of
personalization. The challenges and complexities significantly increased for individuals,
organizations, and government with the proliferation of PVCs. The legal framework of
individual security management has been protracted into the technical context of PII,
which comprises any evidence that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s
identity, such as date of birth, name, social security number, and biometric records
(Marwick & Boyd, 2014).
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Identification of Gaps
Many studies have examined the area of user behavior on social media platforms.
However, most of the studies focus on privacy. Saridakis, Benson, Ezingeard, and
Tennakoon (2016) noted an imbalance in behavioral research on online social networks,
with many reviews on privacy, while issues about information security remain mostly
unexplored. Saridakis et al. (2016) studied the relationship of social-network users’
activity and security perceptions of personal information security on social networking
services (SNS) to online victimization. They found individuals with high perceived
control over personal information on the social network, individuals with high perceived
risk propensity on social networks, and individuals with multi-purpose social networks
are less likely to be victims of cybersecurity attacks, while users of knowledge exchange
social networks are more likely to experience cyber security attacks.
Much of the current literature that emphasizes user security behavior are studies
conducted in corporate environments. These studies highlight the potential economic
losses to organizations resulting from online information and security breaches
(Campbell et al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004), further adding to the shortage of
coverage of security threats at the individual level. However, previous studies have
indicated that organizations that have neglected to concentrate on individuals’ security
practices fail to accomplish success in their efforts to preserve security (Li et al., 2010;
Stanton et al., 2005; Webb et al., 2014). Additionally, Abraham (2011) conducted an
extensive literature review of the factors that affect information security behavior.
Despite a wealth of studies in the area, Abraham reported that most of the studies focused
on “compliance with security policies.” Anderson et al. (2010), examined the
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behavioral intentions of “home” computer users. They focused on the impact of factors
such as attitude, self-efficacy, subjective norms, and psychological ownership.
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) found that technical efficacy is the crucial factor to ensure
security. No prior study examined the combination of constructs, including
safeguarding cost, user experience, coupled with group norms through an integrated
model to motivate individual computer users to engage in security behavior.
While several studies presented profile sharing as a risk to security in virtual
communities, researchers have failed to provide irrefutable evidence as to why Internet
users who claim to value their privacy still chose to share sensitive information online.
As a result, the issue of privacy paradox continues to be a predominant factor, especially
in the context of virtual communities (Sutanto, Palme, Tan, & Phang, 2013). Prior studies
alluded disclosure in VCs to unawareness to the risks and problems of security threats.
However, they failed to provide a mechanism by which Internet users can develop their
confidence and the required skills to protect their data and systems from technology
threats (Lutz & Strathoff, 2014).
Despite the overwhelming level of knowledge that is shared among users in
PVCs, it remains mainly about personal, social, political, and economic concepts. Also,
many of the extant computer security literature on user information security knowledge
sharing and information security experience relate to information security behavior in
organizations (Safa & Von, 2016; Safa et al., 2016; Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila,
2014). This study focuses on information knowledge sharing in the context of PVCs, on
the basis that knowledge sharing is a factor of involvement, which is predicted to
heighten avoidance motivation. Unlike organizations, PVCs do not have common
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security goals, and individual users have their motivations for accessing the environment.
Therefore, the researcher will incorporate information security knowledge sharing as a
measure of involvement to determine how the sharing of security knowledge among PVC
users may impact users’ technology threat avoidance motivation and further avoidance
behavior.
Furthermore, several studies have investigated the security behavior in
understanding the home computer usage and compliance in organizations (Arachchilage
& Love, 2014; Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Li & Siponen, 2011; Liang & Xue,
2010; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). However, there is insufficient evidence in the
literature on user security behavior in virtual communities and how to motivate individual
users to engage in technology threats avoidance behavior, through an integrated
approach. Moreover, continuing research on online safety recommends new motivational
factors for technology threat avoidance (Tsai et al., 2016).

Summary
There are many security issues in PVC environments, including virtualization,
big-data processing, application security, access control, and authentication.
Progressively, many information security-related practices such as patch management
and antivirus updates are being automated to lessen task knowledge and loads on users,
while increasing the use of advanced technology such as encryption and machine
learning (Choi, Choi, & Kim, 2014). Appropriate security policies in PVCs are
addressing other tasks such as the appropriate use of computer and network resources,
multifactor authentication, and good password habits. For instance, many VCs have
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built-in multi-layered password requirements, account and activity verification, and
investigation of suspicious activities or violations of terms or policies. Also, data access
requires authentication and access control model due to access right for users.
However, through networked publics, constructed spaces of networked
technologies and imagined communities, PVCs have established platforms where
individuals can share and connect with other professionals. In this environment, users are
forced to reassess their security practices (He, 2013). While online technologies raised
numerous information management issues of security, new technologies, including large
databases and social media, have further complicated security practices. Such
technologies transform the information landscape and raise concerns about group norms,
sharing, and security policies in PVCs. Since PVC content may be distributed globally, it
is the tendency to argue that the only way to maintain total control of one’s data and to
keep security controls is not to share at all. However, PVCs emerge and expand based on
the level of sharing and collaboration of its members. Hence, security policy and
strategies are developed to assist with the protection of users’ data. Nevertheless, users
continue to experience multiple data breaches and security threats.
There are limited studies that address the regulations PVCs users can undertake
to increase their security, as well as guidelines to motivate avoidance behavior.
Additionally, even with the guidance provided by federal regulations regarding security
policies, there remain some policy gaps in many areas. Furthermore, while PVCs are
making efforts to improve security using technology tools, research indicates that
information security cannot be achieved by technological tools alone. Hence, new
approaches, including information knowledge sharing, increasing self-efficacy,
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organizational culture, and the appropriate level safeguarding measure costs are essential
to motivate user information security behavior.
The application of critical constructs from the technology threat theory,
involvement theory and social cognitive theory to address individual security behavior
in PVCs in an integrated approach provided a formal model to guide security threat
avoidance practices in PVCs. As a result, this study developed a framework that
addressed the gaps in the literature by using information security sharing and
information security knowledge experience to increase user information security
avoidance motivation behavior in PVCs.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview of Research Design
In this study, the researcher developed a conceptual model by synthesizing three
theories: technology threat avoidance theory, involvement theory, and social cognitive
theory, to explain user information security behavior in professional virtual communities.
The research model comprises nine constructs: safeguarding measure cost, self-efficacy,
perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, information security knowledge sharing,
information security experience, group norms, avoidance motivation, and avoidance
behavior. This study employed an online survey methodology to collect information
relating to each construct, users’ security concerns, and LinkedIn experience and usage
frequency. The researcher also collected demographic data, including gender, age,
educational background, and ethnicity.
This quantitative study employed a web-based survey to collect data as a one-time
survey using a cross-sectional approach. Data were collected randomly from adult
LinkedIn members over seven weeks to establish the relationship between avoidance
motivation and avoidance behavior. According to Evans & Mathur (2005), a web-based
survey is more accessible, easier to administer, and is more convenient to the respondents
(online users) than a printed survey. Moreover, web-based surveys have simple
descriptive statistics embedded, which provides available concurrent analysis, and more
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sophisticated statistical analysis can be performed by exporting the data to appropriate
statistical software. This unique data analysis feature in electronic surveys can reduce the
time and resources required, especially for large datasets (Duffett et al., 2012). The
embedded data analysis feature of the web-based survey also decreases the chance of
human error affecting the integrity of the dataset, thereby increasing the reliability of the
subsequent analysis (Bryman, 2012).
The survey included a five-point Likert rating scale to give participants amble
options to demonstrate their agreement with a statement. Except for one question, the
scale ranged from (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree to (5) strongly
agree. Question 4 measured self-efficacy and used a scale of (1) not confident at all, (2)
slightly confident, (3) somewhat confident, (4) moderately confident, (5) very confident.
The Likert scale is appropriate when capturing the attitudes of survey participants (Claar,
2011; Ng et al., 2009; Rea & Parker, 2005). The survey applied a funnel approach,
starting from demographics and general questions such as the number of years using
LinkedIn and frequency of usage to more specific questions addressing the variables, in a
manner that is easy for categorization and coding. The instrument had multiple parts, an
introduction, to identify the research, establish the purpose of the study, and provide
instructions for completing the survey; a set of calibration questions to ascertain the
participants’ user information security behavior in professional virtual communities, and
LinkedIn related items.
The unit of analysis was individual LinkedIn users, regardless of educational
background, gender, occupation, or information security experience. Respondents were
self-selected to participate in the survey. This study was structured in four stages: expert

41
panel review, pilot study, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using AMOS, and
structural equation modeling (SEM) using AMOS.

Data Collection
The primary data collection method for this study was a web-based survey. A
web-based survey was appropriate since the target respondents are online users and have
access to the Internet. Hence, the participants could respond to the survey at any time and
place. Web-based surveys provide an advantage of obtaining data efficiently with regards
to time, energy, and costs. Web surveys make quantifiable data easy to analyze and
interpret, as well as collect standardized, quantitative data from a large sample size
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Checkmarket.com hosted the survey.
The survey was distributed to 1285 LinkedIn members, over the age of 18.
The survey was distributed on the public LinkedIn platform in adherence with the
LinkedIn privacy policy. The survey was disseminated using a variety of other methods:
via email, send with CheckMarket’s email collector system, and with the researcher’s
email system, the web, using URL/social media, post to LinkedIn, and QR code, and
short messaging service (SMS) mobile text. All participants were sent an invitation with a
brief description of the study, information about the informed consent, confidentiality,
and a link with the URL of the survey. The participants received three email reminders
about the survey. Respondents completed the web-based survey anonymously. The
respondents were not monitored. Respondents could complete the survey from any
location, using any device. The survey responses were automatically collected and stored
in CheckMarket’s database.
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Instrument Development and Validation
Instrument Development
Since there are no comprehensive instruments designed to measure all the
constructs of the proposed model in an integrated approach, therefore, the researcher
constructed a survey instrument. Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, and Wei (2003) indicated that
adapting items from prior studies will enhance validity. Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill
argued that (2003, p. 291) “adopting or adapting questions is more efficient than
developing questions yourself if it enables you to gather the appropriate data needed to
meet the demands of the study,” therefore, the survey instrument (questionnaire) was a
combination of questions adapted and adopted from previous research. As many PVC
users only use their mobile devices to access their profile, the survey was designed “fit
for mobile.”
A web-based survey consisting of 42 self-reported items were designed to collect
responses from LinkedIn users. Except for self-efficacy with five items and avoidance
motivation with three items, each construct was measured with four items. The number of
items was moderately low, as research has shown insignificant improvement on internal
consistency with more than five items per construct. Also, keeping a survey short can
eliminate possible response bias triggered by respondents’ fatigue (Hinkin, 1998). The
survey comprised of a series of questions to collect demographic information such as
gender, age, and years of experience using LinkedIn, as well as questions to elicit
information on the constructs of the research including safeguarding measure cost, selfefficacy, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, information security knowledge
sharing, information security experience, group norms, avoidance motivation, and
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avoidance behavior. The constructs were established based on a thorough review of the
literature and derived from the elements of TTAT, Involvement theory, and SCT. To
develop a measure for avoidance behavior in information security, the existing measures
in the IS literature (e.g., Furman et al, 2009; Liang & Hue, 2010; Ng et al, 2009; Nyeste,
2011) were evaluated to reflect tasks that relate to protecting user information and
computer systems in professional virtual communities. All the items were adapted from
prior related research for this study. The items that were not appropriate for the context of
this study were rephrased or redefined.
Items for self-efficacy were adapted from Compeau and Higgins (1995), Rhee,
Kim, and Ryu (2009) and Liang and Xue (2010). These items examined self-efficacy in
information security; for instance, users rated their confidence on each item based on
their ability to solve problems dealing with information security and their ability to
protect their information and computer systems. The information security experience
items measured whether users’ computers have been infected with malware and whether
users have been a victim of cyber fraud. Avoidance motivation items measured security
practice from both technology aspect and security-conscious behavior.
The constructs of perceived threat severity and perceived susceptibility were
adapted from Liang and Xue (2010) and Dinev and Hart (2004). Safeguarding measure
cost and avoidance motivation items were adapted from Liang and Xue (2010) and Milne
et al. (2002). These items assessed users’ perception of the potential harm of malicious
technology threats and examined the probability of a malicious technology threat’s
occurrence. Items for avoidance motivation were based on the behavioral intention
measures from technology adopted research (Ling & Xue, 2009; Ng et al., 2009; Smith,
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1996). These items were modified slightly to suit the context of information security and
threat avoidance rather than information technology adoption.
Information security knowledge sharing was measured with items adapted from
Claar (2011) and Hsu et al. (2007), who developed measurement items from Davenport
and Prusak (1998). These items were modified to fit user information security behavior in
PVCs. Information security knowledge sharing items focused on the willingness to share
information on technology threats and security solutions. Additionally, items measuring
group norms were adapted from Tamjidyamcholo et al. (2013). These items explored the
strength of executing the shared goal by an individual member and other members within
the PVC.
After the initial development of a survey instrument based on the literature, the
researcher collected feedback from a panel of experts to ensure instrument validity.
Following the expert panel review, the initial instrument was adjusted by rewording,
restructuring, adding, and removing items. The revised instrument was then pilot-tested
to ensure members of the survey population easily understand it. The revised instrument
was further modified based on the reviews and data analysis of the pilot test.
Subsequently, data were collected using the final version of the instrument for data
analyses. Table 1 contains the survey items and the source of each item.
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Table 1
Survey items for measuring user information security behavior in a PVC (e.g., LinkedIn)
Constructs
Self-efficacy

SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
Safeguarding
Measure
Cost
SMC1
SMC2
SMC3
SMC4

Description

Source

Please rate your confidence in ability to execute the
following security features on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 =
not confident at all, 2 = slightly confident, 3 = somewhat
confident, 4 = moderately confident, and 5 = very confident.
I can easily enable security features on LinkedIn by myself. Compeau &
Higgins,
1995
I can correctly install security software on my computer
Liang and
Xue
I can use different security software to protect my
Rhee et al.
information.
2009
I can configure my web browser security settings.
Rhee et al.
2009
I can easily find information on how to secure my profile on Rhee et al.
LinkedIn
2009
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 – agree, and 5 =
strongly agree.
Enabling security measures decreases the convenience
afforded by LinkedIn
Enabling security features on LinkedIn would be timeconsuming.
Complying with the security requirements of LinkedIn is
burdensome.
Security software may cause problems to other programs on
my PC.

Perceived
Please indicate the likelihood of being affected by the
Susceptibility following security risks on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 = not at all
likely, 2 = not very likely, 3 = somewhat likely, 4 = very
likely, and 5 = extremely likely.
PSUS1
Malware will infect my computer by visiting LinkedIn.
PSUS2

My identity will be stolen by accessing LinkedIn.

PSUS3

My data will be corrupted by visiting LinkedIn.

PSUS4

My personal information on LinkedIn could be misused.

Fruin et al.,
1991
Milne et al.,
2002
Milne et al.,
2002
Liang &
Xue, 2010

Liang &
Xue, 2010
Dinev &
Hart, 2004
Dinev &
Hart, 2004
Dinev &
Hart, 2004
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Perceived
Severity
PSE2
PSE3
PSE4
PSE5

Information
Security
Knowledge
Sharing
ISKS1
ISKS2
ISKS3
ISKS4
Information
Security
Experience
ISE1
ISE2
ISE3
ISE4

Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 =
strongly agree.
Having my computer infected by malware through LinkedIn
is a severe problem for me.
Having my online identity stolen through LinkedIn is a
severe problem for me.
Losing personal data because of malware through LinkedIn
is a severe problem for me.
Losing organizational data because of malware through
LinkedIn is a severe problem for me.

Ng, et al.,
2009
Woon et al.,
2005
Ng, et al.,
2009
Ng, et al.,
2009

Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 =
strongly agree.
If I find new security threats, I will inform LinkedIn
members.
If I find a solution to security threats, I will share with
LinkedIn members.
Sharing of information security knowledge with LinkedIn
members is always beneficial.
Sharing of information security knowledge with PVC
members is valuable to me.

Hsu et al.,
2007
Hsu et al.,
2007
Hsu et al.,
2007
Hsu et al.,
2007

Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 =
strongly agree.
I have experience with my data being corrupted by
malware.
I have experience with my identity being stolen by a cyberattack.
I have experience with my computer being infected with
malware.
I have experience with my personal data being misused
through a cyber-attack.

Claar, 2011
Claar, 2011
Chang &
Chen, 2008
Chang &
Chen, 2008
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Group
Norms
GN1
GN2
GN3
GN4
Avoidance
Motivation
AM1
AM2
AM3
Avoidance
Behavior
AB1
AB2
AB3
AB4

Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 =
strongly agree.
Members encourage action that benefit the security of
LinkedIn
Members engage in activities that benefit the security of
LinkedIn.
Members take actions that avoid threats to the security of
LinkedIn.
Members are opposed to activities that may harm the
security of LinkedIn.

Zeng, et al.,
2009
Zeng, et al.,
2009
Zeng, et al.,
2009
Zeng, et al.,
2009

Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 =
strongly agree.
I intend to use security software to avoid malware on
LinkedIn.
I plan to use security software to avoid malware on
LinkedIn.
I will add additional security measures to protect my
information on LinkedIn.

Liang &
Xue, 2010
Liang &
Xue, 2010
Ng et al.,
2009

Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 =
strongly agree.
I update my computer security software regularly.
Liang &
Xue, 2010
I look for a security icon, trust mark, or HTTPS to verify
Furman et
that LinkedIn is secure before logging on.
al., 2012
I have changed the security settings on my computer that
Nyeste,
pertain LinkedIn access.
2011
I add additional software to mitigate impacts of information Ng et al.,
security breaches on LinkedIn.
2009

Reliability
Reliability is “the degree to which measures are free from error and, therefore,
yield consistent results” (Zikmund, 1988, p. 260). Each of the measures were previously
validated (Chang & Chen, 2008; Claar, 2011; Dinev & Hart, 2004; Furman et al., 2012;
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Hsu et al., 2007; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al, 2009; Zeng, et al., 2009). However, many
of these measures were not testing in the context of professional virtual communities, and
these measures were not previously tested as an integrated instrument. The goal of
reliability testing is to establish the possible measurement error in a measurement model
and method (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). An interval ratio scale measured the test
participants’ differences, order, and equality of the magnitude of the differences in the
variables and to provide a method of analyzing the arithmetic values quantitatively.
The instrument was analyzed using the inter-item consistency reliability test,
based on the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient (α) method, to evaluate if the variables are
reliably constructed. The Cronbach’s Alpha is an appropriate method to determine
internal consistency reliability when the researcher uses Likert scale questions in the
survey instrument (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). The Cronbach’s Alpha for internal
consistency reliability in confirmatory research should be a minimum of 0.70 (Gefen,
Straub, & Boudreau, 2000; Straub et al., 2004). Therefore, the reliability processing result
considered an acceptable significant level of reliability for the item measures that
returned a Cronbach’s Alpha close to 1.
However, Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient (α) may under or overestimate reliability
(Raykov, 1997, 1998a). According to (Bollen, 1989, p.221) coefficient alpha (α) “makes
no allowances for correlated error of measurements, nor does it treat indicators
influenced by more than one latent variable." Therefore, the composite reliability was
also calculated to evaluate the reliability of the scale more accurately. The composite
reliability is a measure of the overall reliability of a scale based on each construct within
the scale (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).

49
According to Zikmund (1988), to detect and eliminate errors with a survey
instrument before distributing the survey to all respondents, it is crucial to implement a
pilot trial run. Sekaan (2003) recommends a pretest of a survey, to ensure questions are
appropriately worded, measurements are used correctly, and questions are interpreted
correctly. For this study, a pilot test was used to test the reliability of the instrument, to
eliminate errors and bias, and to establish consistent measurement across the items. The
instrument was converted to a web-based survey and distributed to a group of 22 virtual
community users to review and provide feedback. The pilot participants also completed a
set of review questions to guide their feedback. The review questions focused on the
elements of the survey, including the instructions, test questions, format, and length of
time to complete. The pilot participants indicated yes or no to whether they found each
element of the survey operative, clear, and easy to understand.
The pilot participants provided details of any element they found to be ineffective,
unclear, or confusing. The comments from the pilot test were reviewed, and appropriate
changes made to the instrument based on the results of the test. The results of the survey
were stored in CheckMarket’s database server and were automatically transferred into the
IBM statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) database, to eliminate transcription
and transfer errors (Roztocki & Lahri, 2003; Stanton, 1998).

Validity
Zikmund (1988, p. 262) defined validity as “whether a measure ... measures what
it is supposed to measure.” To ensure that the quality of the instrument is high, that it
measures the variables accurately, and to assess the goodness of the measures, the
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researcher completed a series of preliminary analysis. The preliminary analysis includes
an item analysis, reliability, and validity test. Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001)
indicated that content validity is critical to remove items from formative scales based on
theoretical methods without compromising the robustness of the instrument. Sekeran
(2003) posited that content validity “ensures that the measure includes an adequate and
representative set of items that tap the concept” (p. 206).
According to Bagozzi and Phillips (1991), construct validity refers to the extent to
which the measure of a construct adequately measures the intended concept. Schwab
(1980, p.5) defined construct validity as “representing the correspondence between
a construct (conceptual definition of a variable) and the operational procedure to measure
or manipulate that construct.” Schwab (1980) further indicated that a construct is a
significant part of construct validation, a multistep process for assessing the adequacy of
measures. Construct validity determines the degree to which each measure correctly
measures its targeted variable. Additionally, construct validity also eliminates excessive
random errors such as measurement errors or informant bias that may weaken the
statistical results and lead to false acceptance of the null hypotheses (Nunnally,
1978). Construct validity was established to conclusively identify the significant
relationships among various social constructs and their effects on user information
security behavior in PVCs.
Straub (1989) argued that validity could be established by allowing experts
familiar with the content of the research to evaluate the instrument until they reach a
consensus on the content of the instrument. Sekaran (2003) recommended the use of an
expert panel to ensure the content validity of the measures within a survey. The
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researcher conducted an expert panel review to establish content validity. The literature
does not specify the precise number of experts to include in a pretest. However, Olson
(2010) posited that an expert panel could be as few as two to over 20 reviewers, while
Presser and Blair (1994) highlighted that the number of expert reviewers tends to be
small, with two or three experts. Accordingly, three experts with relevant information
security, research methodology, and social media background were consulted for this
study. The expert panel consisted of one information security subject matter expert
(SME), one professor in quantitative analysis and research methods, and a social media
analyst.
The panel reviewed the survey instrument using an expert panel survey evaluation
tool. The evaluation tool was adapted from the Olson (2010) research, which is based on
an examination of a questionnaire evaluation by expert reviewers. The panel was asked to
review and provide comments on the survey instrument according to the evaluation tool
standards. The evaluation tool examined the content, cognitive and usability features, and
the overall structure of the instrument. The panel was also asked to rate each question on
the characteristics of burdensome, sensitivity, and potential failure of the response
process. Overall, the panel verified that the measurement items (empirical indicators) are
adequate, represent the concepts, and are logically as well as theoretically connected to
the construct, user security behavior.
Construct validity can also be established through factor analysis (Straub, 1989).
The researcher employed a series of empirical tests to evaluate the measurement
properties of the empirical indicators and established that they are unidimensional,
reliable, and valid. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to examine the linear
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association among the empirical indicators regarding the latent variables, to assess
the unidimensionality of the measures (Kim & Mueller, 1978). Confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) method was also used to assess the hypotheses (Gerbing & Anderson,
1988). The CFA model was specified with the latent variable and the associated empirical
indicators. The empirical indicators to load on specific variables were restricted
before analyzing the data. Variables with low loading (<0.50) or non-significant loading
were removed from the latent variable unless it was predetermined that theoretically the
factor should not be eliminated. Factors with Eigenvalue greater than 1 and factor loading
higher than 0.50 were retained for further analysis (Walker, Gebregriabher, MartinHarris, & Egede, 2015).
The extent to which the data collected were applicable or transferable to other
virtual communities hinged on the validity of the study. The internal validity of the study
measures the confidence in the strength of the relationship and the effect sizes between
the variables. Internal validity supports the justifications for the results of the study and
assists to decrease other unexpected reasons for the results. The history and maturation
effects in the study were controlled by capturing data from users simultaneously within a
short space of time, to reduce the impact of possible changes that may occur over time.

Population and Sample
The target population for the study was LinkedIn members. The participants were
randomly selected and have a wide variance in computer understanding, information
security abilities, and expertise, and covers a variety of industries, age groups, and
backgrounds. The random sampling approach eliminated select bias and allowed for a
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better representation of the target population (Son & Kim, 2008). This study sought to
establish the generalizability of the population through a reliable and valid sample size
with high precision, a margin of error of +/-5%, standard deviation of .5 and a confidence
level of 95%. At the time of data collection, there were approximately 5,000,000
LinkedIn members (Aslam, 2018).
From this population, a minimum sample size of 385 was needed to obtain a 30%
response rate. A total of 1285 survey participants were invited to participate in the study.
Of the 1285 invited participants, 388 participants responded to the survey, resulting in a
response rate of 30%. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), a response rate of 30%
is an acceptable response rate. Three email reminders were sent to the participants to
increase the response rate. For respondents who started but did not complete the survey, a
reminder email was sent one day after the respondents began the survey.

Pre-analysis Data Screening
According to Levy (2006, p. 150), “pre-analysis data preparation deals with the
process of detecting irregularities or problems with the collected data.” SEM programs
standard errors are calculated on the assumption that data were collected from a large
sample size, primarily when data are not normally distributed or otherwise flawed.
According to Loehlin (2004), for a model of up to four factors, at least 100 data cases
should be collected. The data were prescreened to ensure that any quality issues were
addressed and that the conclusion drawn from the data collected was valid (Mertler &
Vannatta, 2009). First, the data were prescreened for incomplete or missing data. To
reduce the possibility of missing data in the collection process, the survey was created
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with all items set as a required field. Of the 388 respondents, eight had missing data. The
researcher employed a listwise deletion approach as an ad hoc solution to the missing
data problem. The listwise approach was appropriate, as the proportion of cases with
missing data was small, at two percent.
According to Roth (1994), if the proportion of missing data is less than five
percent, the listwise deletion approach may be acceptable. Following Rubin’s (1976)
missing data mechanisms, it was assumed that the data were missing completely at
random (MCAR) as all the records with missing data values had responses for only the
first two demographic questions. MCAR was an assumption, as there is no certainty. As
highlighted by Schafer and Graham (2002), "when missingness is beyond the researcher's
control, its distribution is unknown, and MAR is only a postulation. Also, traditionally,
the listwise deletion has been considered most appropriate for SEM with large sample
sizes, over 250 (Hair et al., 2014). This study matched that criteria with N= 380. The
survey data was also prescreened for skewness and kurtosis (Hair et al., 2014).

Data Analysis
Upon completion of data collection activities, the data were analyzed utilizing the
Cronbach alpha (CA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and structural equation
modeling (SEM) techniques. This study used IBM SPSS program to analyze the survey
data. Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM) using AMOS
(Analysis of Moment Structures) software were used to confirm and interpret the results
from the primary data gathered. CFA was conducted to establish the validity of the model
by assessing and establishing the validity of factor loadings on the variables and the
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relationships between the variables (Hooper, Coughlan, & Muller, 2008). Acceptance of
the results was contingent on the amount of variance in the dependent variable and was
accounted for by the independent variable and the effect size.
According to Aruckle (2007), SEM is the most suitable method to examine the
relationship between independent, mediating, and dependent variables. SEM allows a
researcher to exam a group of regression equations concurrently. It confirms the loading
relationships between the measured and latent variables and determines the covariances
between the latent variables through model fitness (Foster & Barkus, 2006). Within SEM,
the researcher tested various configurations of the path diagrams. The optimal path was
selected to represent the data graphically. Additionally, SEM was used to analyze the
structural relationships among the observed and unobserved variables of the hypotheses
using path diagrams, and to investigate the contributing powers of the factors as to how
they significantly affect user information security behavior.
SEM includes a series of multivariate techniques that are confirmatory rather than
exploratory in model fit testing (McDonald, 2013). The SEM approach defined a
theoretical causal model with a set of predicted covariances between the variables. The
proposed model in this study stems from the literature and three fundamental theoriestechnology threat avoidance theory, involvement theory, and social cognitive theory.
Consequently, path and confirmatory factor analysis within SEM are acceptable for this
study (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). SEM is a suitable approach for this survey as it
encompasses a vast array of complex statistical relationships and models such as path
analysis, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and time series analyses (Hair et al., 2010).
In the SEM analyses, the results obtained from the sample data were validated to
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develop general conclusions about user information security behavior in virtual
communities. The results were analyzed based on features of overall indices of model fit,
parameter estimates, and standard errors.
For power estimation of the factors, the MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara
(1996) estimate the power approach was adopted, which is relative to an alternative
hypothesis specified regarding lack of fit. The goodness of fit, a primary SEM statistic,
reflects the difference between the observed model’s covariance matrix and the minimum
fit model’s covariance matrix. The estimate was based on the degrees of freedom (dfs) of
the model, and the root means square error of approximation (RMSEA), (Browne &
Cudeck, 1993). Estimates with values of .06 or less represented a close-fitting model (Hu
& Bentler, 1999) and were accepted, while values larger than .10 illustrated poor-fitting
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993) and were rejected. After establishing that the model is
reasonable, the hypotheses were tested by evaluating the model parameter estimates for
both the exogenous and endogenous variables of the study (Walker et al., 2015).
The parameter estimates or coefficients were examined for each path in the SEM
model to determine if one path is more significant than other paths in
predicting avoidance motivation and user information security behavior. Additionally, the
study compared the covariance matrix to determine if the proposed model is an effective
way to model the relationships among the variables. Chi-square and comparative fit
index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990) fit statistics were used to determine if the data fit the
PVCTTAM and the extent to which the theoretical model was supported. CFI is an
indicator in estimating the improvement in non-centrality when going from observed to a
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null model. The study accepted CFI values greater than 0.95, which represents good
fitting models (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
This study builds on extant literature on information security by establishing
methods to curtail the distribution of personal information that may expose users to
security threats. The study also presents a case for the motivation of users to engage in
information security knowledge sharing actively, to increase self-efficacy and experience
to effectively identify and implement information security methods to protect their
systems and information in the virtual world. This study also identifies factors for virtual
community designers and lawmakers to consider users’ information security behavior and
technology threat avoidance.

Resource Requirements
Before collecting data, permission the researcher obtained from the Nova
Southeastern University institutional review board (IRB), as shown in Appendix B.
Draw.io diagrams, a diagramming and collaboration software was used to design the
conceptual model. CheckMarket hosted and stored the survey data. Data tables were
prescreened and stored using Microsoft Excel. The survey was distributed via
LinkedIn.com, Gmail, and Yahoo. Data analysis was executed using the IBM statistical
package for social science (SPSS) 24 and IBM analysis of a moment structures (AMOS)
25. An expert panel was used to validate the survey instrument.

Summary
This chapter presents a detailed account of the proposed user professional virtual
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community technology threat avoidance model (PVCTTAM) and its variables, the
instrument development, and the research methodology used in this quantitative study.
To establish content validity the instrument was developed based on an extensive review
of the literature, including theories, past instruments, and models related to user
information security, technology threat avoidance, and virtual communities. The
instrument, presented in Appendix A, was developed by adapting and adopting items
from prior research. An expert panel review was conducted to test the face and content
validity, an expert study. The reliability of the test was established using the inter-item
consistency reliability test, based on the Cronbach’s coefficient Alpha method, with data
from the study.
This study employed a web-based survey methodology. The survey was
distributed via email, social media, and SMS randomly to 1285 adult LinkedIn members.
Before administering the survey, an expert panel review and a pilot study were conducted
to assist in ensuring the reliability and validity of the instrument. The survey was then
administered to the main survey population. After the data were collected, the data were
prescreened for missing data, skewness, and kurtosis. The reliability and validity of the
data were also assessed to reduce measurement errors and improve the overall fit of the
model (Hair et al., 2014). For data analysis, the researcher used SPSS 24 and AMOS 25.
The data analysis methods utilized were Cronbach’s Alpha (CA), confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA), and structural equation modeling (SEM). Each hypothesis was evaluated
by examining the associated variables and the path. This chapter also presented an
overview of the general issues about barriers, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations.
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Chapter 4
Results

Overview
This study aims to understand the factors which influence professional virtual
community users to engage in security avoidance behaviors against technology threats.
The research examined two central questions:
1. How do factors from the technology threat avoidance theory and involvement
theory predict individual computer users’ technology threat avoidance
motivation in professional virtual communities?
2. How do self-efficacy, group norms, and avoidance motivation safeguards
predict users’ avoidance security behavior in professional virtual
communities?
On the hypotheses, there are nine constructs and eight paths in the professional
community model. Safeguarding measure cost, self-efficacy, perceived susceptibility,
perceived severity, information security knowledge sharing, information security
experience, and group norms are the latent (unobservable) variables in the model. A total
of 29 items measured the latent variables. Except for self-efficacy with five items, all
latent variables were measured with four items. The PVC model is represented using both
structural and measurement models. The structural model is based on the relationships
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among the latent variables, while the measurement model specifies the relationships
between the observed and the latent variables (Safa et al., 2016).
This study adopted the Hair et al. (2010) two-step SEM process approach. First,
the model fit and construct validity were tested in CFA. Second, after achieving a
measurement model with sufficiently valid measurements, the structural model was
tested. Hence, the results of the model overall fit and validity were assessed based on two
key tests, one measurement and one structural. CFA is a multivariate statistical theorytesting procedure. CFA verify whether the data fit the theorized factor model and
establish the extent of the relationship between observed variables and their latent
constructs. CFA was appropriate for this study as the model was developed from a review
of the research literature and established theories. SEM provides the added advantage of
the isolation of observational error in the latent variable measurements. The dataset was
also pretested in SPSS for reliability and validity, as well as preliminary statistical
analysis including collinearity issues, missing data, and normality identification.
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the data gathered from the survey
respondents, using the online survey instrument, illustrated in Appendix A. This chapter
also presents the results of the expert panel review and the pilot test, which was used to
validate the instrument further. Additionally, this chapter includes the results of the
Cronbach Alpha for reliability testing using SPSS, confirmatory factor analysis, and
structured equation modeling approaches. The results of the measurement model and
structural model data analyses and hypotheses testing were also presented, as well as a
collective analysis and discussion of the findings of the study.
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Expert Panel
According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009), a questionnaire should be
tested for systematic or built-in errors, possibilities of vagueness, bias, dual meaning, and
technical inaccuracy. It is usual for researchers to rely on a panel of experts to assess the
validity of the instrument (Olson, 2010). To ensure the reliability and validity of the
survey instrument, it was vetted by a panel of information security experts and research
professor before it was administered to the survey population. Subject matter experts
(SME) focused on the content and face validity of the survey instrument by exploring the
theoretical constructs of the model and their operational representations. The experts also
reviewed the instrument for clarity, readability, sensitive items, burdensomeness, logical
flow, and other possible measurement errors in the survey.
The expert panel vetted the instrument in two iterations. They provided feedback
and rechecked the instrument until all experts were completely satisfied with the content.
The panelists identified phrasings and implications issues with some items in the survey
instrument. The experts further recommended changes to the length of the instrument,
and adjustments to the wording and structure of some questions. The experts also guided
rewording item choices based on a possible misinterpretation of avoidance versus
mitigation and establishing item choices as actionable behavior. The researcher adjusted
the instruments based on the changes suggested by the expert team; I reworded and
restructured a few questions and eliminated two questions from the survey instrument.

Pilot Study
A pilot study was undertaken to evaluate the reliability of the instrument,
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the methods, and procedures of the main study, and to identify any potential problems
with the survey. The pilot study also tested whether all the participants similarly
interpreted the questions. The pilot study participants were selected based on the
characteristics of the primary research. They were all LinkedIn members over the age of
18. Thirty LinkedIn users were invited to participate in the pilot study. Each participant
was advised to complete the survey and provide feedback on the overall quality of the
survey. Specifically, participants were asked to provide feedback on the clarity of the
survey items, the length of the survey, wording, ambiguity, and comprehension of the
instrument Twenty-two respondents completed the survey. The pilot testing indicated that
the participants understood and interpreted the questions correctly. After the pilot study,
the researcher made two minor changes to the survey instrument. The ethnicity question
was adjusted to allow respondents to select one choice, with an option for selecting
multiple races and one item, was dropped from the instrument based on the pilot study’s
reliability testing results.
The data from the pilot testing were analyzed using IBM SPSS 24 for internal
consistency reliability using Cronbach’s Alpha. The coefficient of reliability ranges from
0 to 1. If all items in a scale have high covariances, the coefficient is closer to 1, as the
number of items approaches infinity. An acceptable range of Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.700
(Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000; Straub et al., 2004). The reliability statistics analysis
for the pilot study revealed that all the items were a consistent measure for the scale. Selfefficacy = 0.919 safeguard measure = 0.926, perceived susceptibility = 0.906, perceived
severity = 0.974, information security experience = 0.922, and information security
knowledge sharing = 0.780. While acceptable, the CA for information security
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knowledge sharing was affected by a low inter-item correlation of ISKS5. This item was
deleted from the instrument for the main study. Deleting item ISKS5 increased the CA
for information security knowledge sharing to 0.809. The Cronbach’s Alpha for
avoidance behavior was 0.763. Removal of item AB1 would slightly increase the CA for
this construct. However, this item was not removed before the CFA analysis as the
number of items measuring that construct was already low. The overall CA for the
instrument, including an inter-inter correlation of all items was 0.897.

Data Collection
The data were collected using an online survey hosted by CheckMarket, over 50
days, ranging from February to March 2019. The instrument was initially pilot-tested
through a small group of users before being distributed to the population of the main
study. The final version of the survey had five sections with a total of 42 questions, with
all except two constructs measured by four items. The link of the survey was distributed
to 1285 adult LinkedIn members via email, SMS, and posted on the researcher’s
LinkedIn page. A total of 388 respondents participated in the study, resulting in a 30%
response rate. The data were automatically collected and stored in CheckMarket’s
database to eliminate the possibility of data transfer or transcription errors. For analysis,
the data were exported to an excel file. The excel file was then imported into SPSS and
AMOS. Eight of the 388 surveys were incomplete.
The surveys with missing data were rejected and eliminated from the study. This
method is feasible when the missing data is minimal, less than five percent (Roth,1994)
and is assumed to be missing completely at random (Rubin, 1976). These data were
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assumed to be MCAR as in each case, only up to the first two questions, age and gender
were completed. Finally, 380 surveys were saved in the primary dataset for further
analysis. Of the 380 participants, 189 were males and 191 females. A significant amount
of the respondents, forty-three percent, have been using LinkedIn for over five years.
Most of the respondents, twenty-seven percent use LinkedIn at least once per month,
while twenty-two percent use the platform daily. The participants’ demographics are
shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Participants’ Demographics
Variables
Age (years)

Frequency
61
97
118
67
29
8

Percent
16.1
25.5
31.1
17.6
7.6
2.1

189
191

49.7
50.3

LinkedIn Experience Less than 1 year
1-2 years
3-5 years
Over five years

37
43
135
165

9.7
11.3
35.5
43.4

LinkedIn Frequency Regularly (Daily)
Frequently (At least once per week)
Occasionally (At least once per
month)
Seldom (At least once every six
months
Rarely (At least once per year)

87
93
104

22.9
24.5
27.4

48

12.6

48

12.6

Ethnicity

3
24
245

.8
6.3
64.5

Gender

18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
Older than 65
Male
Female

American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Black or African American
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Education

Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
White

1
82

.3
21.6

Less than a high school diploma
High school diploma or equivalent
Some college but no degree
Associate degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate degree

4
14
39
25
115
183

1.1
3.7
10.3
6.6
30.3
48.2

Note. N = 380

Measurement Model
Pre-analysis Data Screening
The data were reviewed for missing data, skewness, and kurtosis. Standard
skewness and kurtosis were applied to test the normal distribution of the data. Skewness
and kurtosis values between -2 and +2 are considered acceptable to prove normal
univariate distribution (George & Mallery, 2010). The results of the skewness tests were
between -1 and +1, except for ISKS4, which was -1.046. The results of the kurtosis test
were between -1.3 and +1.3. These results indicate a normal distribution of the dataset
(George & Mallery, 2010; Hair et al., 2010). The detailed results of the skewness and
Kurtosis and the descriptive properties of the dataset are presented in Appendix D.
Internal Consistency Reliability
To measure the extent to which the measurement model measures the latent
variables, the reliability of the scale was established. The initial reliability of the
measurement model was assessed based on internal consistency reliability and composite
reliability (CR). The internal consistency reliability, which examines the correlations
between items and a factor was measured using the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient (α). In
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social science research, internal reliability is reached when Cronbach’s Alpha value is
greater than 0.70 (Straub et al., 2004). The Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated using SPSS.
Cronbach’s Alpha is obtained under the assumption that all factor loadings and
error variances are equally constrained; hence, the composite reliability was also
computed to establish the true reliability of the scale. The composite reliability assesses
the overall reliability of a construct, based on a group of items that are heterogeneous but
similar. (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Composite reliability was calculated with AMOS 25.0
program and Microsoft Excel, CR = [∑ factor loadings]2 / [∑ factor loadings]2 + ∑ [1factor loadings2], using the modification and correlation indices. A value of .70 or higher
represents an acceptable threshold for composite reliability (Hair et al., 1998).
Table 3 shows the measures of both internal consistency reliability and composite
reliability. The condition of internal consistency was met as the results of both the
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability for all the constructs exceeded .70. Appendix
E shows the detailed results of Cronbach’s Alpha calculation.

Table 3
Internal Consistency Reliability with Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability
Constructs
Self-Efficacy (SE)
Safeguarding Measure Cost
(SMC)
Perceived Susceptibility (PSUS)
Perceived Severity (PSE)
Information Security
Knowledge Sharing (ISKS)
Information Security Experience
(ISE)
Group Norms (GN)
Avoidance Motivation (AM)
Avoidance Behavior (AB)

MaxR(H)
0.908
0.808

Composite
Reliability
0.902
0.776

Cronbach’s
Alpha
0.902
0.769

Number
of Items
5
4

0.897
0.966
0.924

0.876
0.960
0.897

0.870
0.960
0.902

4
4
4

0.834

0.831

0.830

4

0.919
0.979
0.839

0.868
0.933
0.813

0.815
0.926
0.811

4
3
4
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Convergent and Discriminant Validity
The scale was tested for both convergent and discriminant validity. The average
variance extracted (AVE) was calculated to establish convergent validity. Malhotra and
Dash (2011) noted that "AVE is a more conservative measure than CR. Based on CR
alone, the researcher may conclude that the convergent validity of the construct is
adequate, even though more than 50% of the variance is due to error” (Malhotra and
Dash, 2011, p.702). AVE exceeding 0.5 demonstrates acceptable convergent validity
(Hair et al., 2010). For the initial convergent validity testing, the constructs safeguarding
measure cost, fell below the threshold, with an AVE of 0.473. Hence, all but one
construct showed convergent validity, using this assessment. Appendix F shows the
results of the initial convergent and discriminant validity testing, using the AVE and
MSV methods.
The factor loadings of the measurement variables were also examined to validate
the instrument. Factor loadings greater than 0.5 indicate acceptable convergent validity
(Hair et al., 2010). Table 4 shows the results of the standardized factor loadings of the
variables.
Table 4
Standardized Factor Loadings and Validity
Constructs

Items

Factor
Loadings

Cronbach's
Alpha

Self-Efficacy (SE)

SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SMC1

.715
.833
.855
.838
.777
.615

.902

.769

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
.895
.878
.872
.873
.882
.724
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Safeguarding Measure SMC2
.766
.672
Cost (SMC)
SMC3
.799
.681
SMC4
.539
.774
Perceived
PSU1
.842
.870
.831
Susceptibility
PSU2
.824
.811
(PSUS)
PSU3
.882
.808
PSU4
.632
.883
Perceived Severity
PSE1
.888
.960
.955
(PSE)
PSE2
.928
.943
PSE3
.962
.938
PSE4
.923
.951
Information Security ISKS1
.904
.902
.874
Knowledge Sharing
ISKS2
.914
.869
(ISKS)
ISKS3
.741
.872
ISKS4
.732
.880
Information Security ISE1
.758
.830
.778
Experience (ISE)
ISE2
.688
.806
ISE3
.741
.783
ISE4
.782
.772
Group Norms (GN)
GN1
.860
.815
.731
GN2
.939
.704
GN3
.672
.769
GN4
.440
.851
Avoidance Motivation AM1
.940
.926
.872
(AM)
AM2
.987
.837
AM3
.782
.963
Avoidance Behavior
AB1
.606
.811
.797
(AB)
AB2
.641
.774
AB3
.803
.741
AB4
.823
.736
Note. Factor loadings <0.06 are in red. Improved Cronbach’s Alpha if an item is deleted,
highlighted in yellow.

Problems with convergent validity indicate that its observed variables do not
systematically explain the latent variable as the variables do not correlate well with each
other. AVE can be improved by dropping cases, such as dropping the item with the most
significant measurement error variance (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2015). Hair et al.,
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(2014) highlighted that items with an outer loading between .40 and .70 should be
considered for removal. Items with factor loading 0.6 and below were dropped from the
model, before conducting the CFA data analysis. SMC4 in safeguarding measure cost and
GN4 in group norms were removed from the model due to a low factor loading of 0.50
and 0.44 respectively, SMC4 also had a high measurement variance of 12.591 As shown
in Table 5, dropping the items increased the AVE for the construct. Removal of these
items increased both the AVE and the Cronbach’s Alpha of the constructs. The AVE of
group norms increased to 0.692, and the Cronbach’s Alpha increased to 0.851, while the
AVE of safeguarding measure increased to 0.541 and the Cronbach’s Alpha to 0.774.
To establish discriminant validity, the extent to which factors are distinct and
uncorrelated, the correlations between all the possible pairs of constructs were explored.
The discriminant validity was assessed by comparing the maximum shared variance
(MSV) with the average variance extracted (AVE). To demonstrate discriminant validity,
the MSV should be less than the value of AVE (MSV< AVE) for each construct (Hair et
al., 2010). Based on the assessment, the MSV is less than the AVE for each construct.
Also, using the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) method, the square
root of the AVE was greater than the inter-construct correlations, as demonstrated in
Table 5, in bold along the diagonal. Hence, the condition of discriminant validity for the
constructs in the professional virtual community model was established.
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Table 5
Convergent and Discriminant Validity with Inter-Constructs Correlations
Constructs

AVE

MSV

AM

SE

SMC

PSUS

PSE

ISKS

ISE

GN

AB

AM
SE
SMC
PSUS
PSE
ISKS
ISE
GN
AB

0.823
0.648
0.541
0.641
0.857
0.686
0.552
0.692
0.526

0.457
0.203
0.288
0.300
0.128
0.220
0.300
0.175
0.457

0.907
0.244
0.217
0.379
0.358
0.469
0.296
0.393
0.676

0.805
0.058
-0.016
0.042
0.266
0.113
0.283
0.450

0.735
0.462
0.195
0.032
0.537
0.163
0.260

0.801
0.309
0.234
0.548
0.198
0.442

0.926
0.241
0.226
0.121
0.280

0.829
0.132
0.382
0.364

0.743
0.165
0.368

0.832
0.418

0.725

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In the CFA, the path diagram was established to represent the measurement
theory of the professional virtual community model. The path diagram includes nine
latent variables and 34 measured variables, along with their item loadings, the estimated
relationships among the constructs, and the error terms for each indicator. CFA was
applied to explore the relationships among the variables in the model. The maximum
likelihood method in IBM AMOS 25 was used to estimate the models’ parameters. Once
the crucial decisions were made about the estimation techniques, the measurement model
was then tested to determine its validity by establishing acceptable goodness-of-fit and
evidence of construct validity.
Assessing the Measurement Model Fit
CFA, a unique form of SEM analysis was used as a confirmatory test of the
measurement theory to specify if the measure of the constructs is logically and
systematically consistent with the theoretical assumptions of the model. The
measurement theory model illustrated in Appendix G was represented using path
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diagrams. The path diagram demonstrates the relationship between the measured
variables and the latent constructs.
In CFA, validity statistics, including modification fit indices, standardized
loadings, and standardized residuals were used to determine the overall fit of the
measurement model. According to Hair et al., (2010), to establish goodness-of-fit, it is
essential to assess at least one absolute fit index and one incremental fit index, in
addition to the result of the Chi-square (χ2). The goodness-of-fit (GOF) indices and their
threshold values, identified as the rules of thumb by Hu and Bentler (1999) are shown in
table 6 and table 9.
Table 6
Fit indices of the CFA Measurement Model
Metric Indices
Chi-square
(χ2)

Absolute Fit
Measures

Incremental
Fit Indices
Parsimony
Fit Indices

Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
p-Value
Chi-square/ degrees of
freedom
Root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA)
Root Mean Squared
Residual (RMR)
Standardized S(RMR)
Comparative fit index
(CFI)
Normed fit index (NFI)
Incremental fit index (IFI)
Adjusted goodness-of-fit
index (AGFI)

Acceptable
value

≤ 3.00

Reported Values
from model
868.096
453
0.000
1.916

Reflection

Good Validity

≤ 0.06

0.049

Good Validity

≤ 1.00

0.070

Good Validity

≤ 0.08
≥ 0.95

0.054
0.955

Good Validity
Good Validity

≥ 0.90
≥ 0.90
≥ 0.80

0.911
0.955
0.849

Good Validity
Good Validity
Good Validity

Adjustments were made to the model based on the modification indices and
standardized residuals. Six covariances were established between the error variances to
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improve the fit of the model. The global fit measures and comparative fit measures were
assessed to test the overall fit of the model. The central goodness-of-fit values using the
Hu and Bentler (1999) threshold was used to evaluate the fit of the model. The chi-square
test (χ2) with the degree of freedom was used to provide assessment for the global model
fit criterion.
A chi-square value of equal or less than 2 indicates excellent fit. The overall
model revealed a CMIN/df ratio of 868.096/453, resulting in a χ2 of 1.916. Therefore, the
χ2 goodness-of-fit results are significant and indicate a fit between the actual data and the
theoretical model. The chi-square statistics are influenced by the sample size of the study
and can lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. Based on this chi-square assumption,
the dataset of 380 was an adequate sample size to establish fit with chi-square.
Due to the approximation of the p-value provided with chi-square tests, the
incremental fit, absolute fit, and parsimonious fit statistics were also examined.
Comparative fit index (CFI), an incremental fit index assesses the model with a
parsimony adjustment and represents the difference between the observed and predicted
covariance. CFI with a value greater than 0.955 establishes excellent fit. The study
revealed a CFI value of 0.955. Other incremental fit indices established for the model
include the normed fit index (NFI) and incremental fit index (IFI). The acceptable value
for both NFI and IFI is 0.9. The measurement model fit results for both NFI and IFI were
above the cut-offs at 0.911 for NFI and 0.955 for IFI.
The root mean square of approximation (RMSEA), an absolute fit index,
evaluates the extent to which the model fit the covariance of the population. The value for
RMSEA is 0.049. This value is below the 0.05 guideline (Hu & Bentler, 1999),
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establishing a good fit for the model. These indices provide the support that the
professional virtual community measurement model is an acceptable fit with the data, to
minimize type I and type II errors. The model to this point has shown evidence that the
measures have behaved as hypothesized regarding the unidimensionality of the measures
for each of the nine constructs. The raw data for the CFA model fit statistics are shown in
Appendix H.
Validating the Measurement Model
The overall fit of the measurement model was validated during the CFA, by
establishing the measurement relationships between items and constructs, based on the
path estimates, standardized loadings, and standardized residuals. The CFA results
supported the measurement model with a sample size of 380. The model fit was
established with a χ2 of 1.916, CFI of 0.955, SRMR of 0.543, and RMSEA of 0.049. All
the standardized loading estimates exceeded the rules of thumb, that loadings should be a
least 0.5, with 0.7 being more ideal (Hair et al., 2010). Six indicators were below the 0.7
thresholds. However, only one indicator, PSUS4 yielded a loading below 0.6 with a value
of 0.0583 and was considered for deletion, moving into the structural model. All loadings
were significant at a p <.01.
The construct validity of the measurement model was also tested during CFA.
The results indicated that construct validity as a measure of convergent and discriminant
validity was established. As shown in Table 7, the AVE, the summary indicator of
convergence for all constructs were above the standard guideline of 0.50, the MSV was
less than the AVE for all constructs, and the square root of AVE for each construct was
greater than the inter-construct correlations, indicating the factors converge well on the
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latent constructs. Evidence of discriminant validity specified that the constructs are
unique and dissimilar to other constructs. The composite reliability of all but one
constructs was above .80, with safeguarding measure cost (SMC) yielding the lowest CR
of .776. This is much greater than the recommended value of .70 (Nunnally, 1978),
indicating evidence of internal consistency.
Table 7
CFA Reliability, Correlation Matrix and AVEs for Constructs
AB

CR
0.806

AVE
0.585

MSV
0.446

AB
0.765

SE

PSE

ISKS

PSUS

ISE

GN

SE
PSE
ISKS

0.893
0.956
0.881

0.626
0.846
0.656

0.162
0.127
0.211

0.403
0.282
0.348

0.792
0.037
0.168

0.920
0.191

0.810

PSUS
ISE
GN

0.867
0.813
0.868

0.626
0.525
0.692

0.269
0.283
0.146

0.476
0.361
0.382

-0.028
0.081
0.268

0.291
0.200
0.115

0.206
0.068
0.361

0.791
0.519
0.198

0.725
0.154

0.832

SMC
AM

0.776
0.932

0.540
0.823

0.283
0.446

0.282
0.668

0.071
0.230

0.194
0.357

-0.066
0.459

0.465
0.382

0.532
0.290

0.150
0.379

SMC

AM

0.735
0.217

0.907

As the specification of residual terms (E) stipulates, responses to items are
influenced by factors other than the hypothesized latent constructs, which may correlate.
For instance, the residual terms E1 and E5 covaried since they are associated with items
that are very closely worded. Founded on comparable theoretical reasoning, a nonzero
covariance also existed between E6 and E7, E12 and E13, and E14 and E17. As such, it
seems theoretically justifiable to modify the measurement model to all residual terms of
corresponding user security behavior self-concept items to freely covary. These
relationships increased the model fit by placing fewer restrictions on parameter values by
allowing six error covariances to be freely estimated.
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Structural Equation Modeling
The focus in SEM is to assess the overall and relative fit of the model and the
structural dependence relationship between the hypothesized paths, as established by the
structural parameter estimates, between the constructs in the path diagram. SEM provides
a method to examine the relationships between latent constructs with a focus on the
nature and magnitude of the relationships, in a structural model. The structural
relationship between the constructs of a structural model provides an empirical
representation by the structural parameter estimate, identified as a path estimate (Hair et
al., 2010). The professional virtual community displays 35 measured indicator variables
and eight latent constructs. All constructs correlated with each other, however, each
indicator loaded on only one construct. The error terms can correlate only with measures
on the same construct. Adhering to the rule of thumb, with a recommendation of a
minimum of three indicators per constructs (Hair et al. 2010), four constructs were
measured with four items, three constructs were measured with three items, and one
construct was measured with five items.
The measures of the model are all hypothesized as reflective, with the direction of
causality moving from the latent construct to the measured items. Seven constructs (selfefficacy, safeguarding measure cost, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity,
information security knowledge sharing, information security experience, and group
norms) are identified as exogenous, and two constructs (avoidance motivation and
avoidance behavior) are endogenous. Avoidance motivation operates as both an
exogenous (independent) construct, as it influences avoidance behavior and an
endogenous (dependent) construct, having a causal relationship with several independent
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factors. The PVC user behavior theory is tested by evaluating the effects of the
exogenous constructs on the endogenous constructs. The structural model testing was
done using a two-step SEM procedure in AMOS. First, the fit and construct validity of
the proposed measurement model was tested, followed by the structural theory. The unit
of analysis for this study was individual; hence, the analysis was done with individual
responses with a sample size of 380.
Assessing Multicollinearity
The first step in evaluating the complete structural model in SEM was to assess
multicollinearity, high level of correlations among the latent exogenous variables.
Managing multicollinearity is essential when two or more variables is predicting another
variable. The variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostics for multicollinearity was
calculated for each predictor. A VIF equal to or less than 3 is considered acceptable
(Hair et al., 2014). Table 8 indicates that the tolerance for all constructs was greater than
.20 and the VIF of all constructs was below 3.0, indicating that there is a lack of
collinearity among the predictors. In this case, there will be no impact of collinearity on
the cause and effect relationships in the PVC model.
Table 8
Collinearity Assessment
Constants
SMC
PSE
ISKS
PSUS
ISE
GN
SE
AM

Tolerance
.636
.908
.901
.528
.460
.832
.831
.797

VIF
1.571
1.101
1.109
1.892
2.174
1.202
1.204
1.202
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Assessing the Structural Model Fit
The final stage in the SEM process is to evaluate the validity of the structural
model by assessing the fit between the observed data and the hypothesized model. This
process involves replacing the nonstructural covariances among latent factors with the
hypothesized path, as shown in Appendix J. In the SEM process, there is an evaluation of
the degree of divergence between the observed and estimated covariance matrices as well
as the model’s parameters. The statistical significance of each hypothesized path was also
evaluated to determine whether the specified paths were supported. The difference
between an observed covariance matrix and the parameter estimates are used to
approximate the population discrepancy (Mueller, & Hancock, 2008).
As in the CFA measurement model testing, the fit indices for the structural model
include absolute fit, incremental fit, and the model χ2. The Absolute fit indices, RMSEA,
SRMR, and the chi-square test assess the overall fit as a measure of the discrepancy
between observed and implied covariance matrices. The results for the structural model
fit indicate a chi-square value of 1.998, which is below the recommended cutoff of <3.
The RMSEA value of 0.051 is also within the acceptable threshold of model fit, while the
SRMR yielded .065, which is also below the cutoff. The incremental fit indices assess the
absolute or parsimonious fit against a null model. The incremental fit statistics CFI, NFI,
and IF with 0.950, 0.906, and 0.951 respectively, all demonstrate evidence of adequate
structural fit. The parsimonious indices assess the overall model fit as a measure of the
discrepancy between observed and implied covariance based on the complexity of the
model. As valid parameters are added to a model, the fit increased. The AGFI statistic of
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.874 exceeds the >.80 threshold, hence indicting evidence of good fit, as illustrated in
Table 9.
Table 9
Structural Model Fit Indices
Metric
Indices
Chi-square (χ2) Chi-square/df
Absolute Fit
RMSEA
Measures
RMR
SRMR
Incremental Fit CFI
Indices
NFI
IFI
Parsimony Fit
AGFI
Indices

Acceptable
value
≤ 3.00
≤ 0.06
≤ 1.00
≤ 0.08
≥ 0.95
≥ 0.90
≥ 0.90
≥ 0.80

Structural
Model Fit
1.998
0.051
0.075
0.654
0.951
0.906
0.951
0.874

Reflection
Good Fit
Good Fit
Good Fit
Good Fit
Good Fit
Good Fit
Good Fit
Good Fit

The structural model indices results indicate good model fitment. However,
AMOS often offers information on change relationships to improve the model. In SEM,
alternate models should be evaluated to appraise the extent to which the hypothesized
path diagram model is optimal (Shumacker & Lomax, 2010). Hence the modification
indices were examined to test for a local misfit. Modification indices indicate how a
model fit would improve by dropping the chi-square value if the parameters were free,
rather than constrained. Respecification from the residuals and modification indices was
of freezing e3e34. This would only slightly improve the model fit chi-square. After
adding the suggested relationship, the chi-squared to the degree of freedom improved to
1.967. The other matrices were unchanged, except for the NFI and CFI, which increased
by 0.001.
However, it was not theoretically justifiable to covary the items SE3 and
avoidance motivation. Brown (2015) posited that there should be a good justification for
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adding correlated errors between some indicators of the model constructs and not to just
reach the cut-offs for good model fit. Therefore, no further adjustments to the
measurement model were necessary. The structural model represented in Appendix J was
accepted as the optimal model.
According to Hair et al. (2014), based on the significant difference in the chisquare value between the structural and the CFA, the possibility of another meaningful
structural path should be considered, especially if other diagnostics matrices indicates a
particular relationship. However, aligned with the study of Mueller and Hancock (2008),
respecification must have strong theoretical and empirical support. If data and or
theoretical justifications directly motivate respecification, the modified model must be
viewed as exploratory, and may not lead to a model that is based on reality. For this
study, all the fit statistics supported the PVC structural model, with no significant
variations in the other fit indices between the CFA and the structural model.
Comparison of the structural model with CFA measurement model
The professional virtual community structural model represented as the optimal
model in Figure 12 reflected a χ2 of 915.130 with 458 degrees of freedom (p <.05), and
the normed chi-square of 1.998. The model CFI is .950 with an RMSEA of .051. All
these statistics are within the recommended range for good model fit. A comparison of
the structural model with the CFA, as shown in Figure 13, indicates a small change in the
overall model fit between the two models. The only significant change was in a chisquare increase of 47.034 and a variance of five degrees of freedom. A comparison of the
factor loadings as shown in Appendix L of the CFA and the PVC structural model also
reflected an insignificant change, with most of the changes within a range of + or - .001-
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.005, indicating a level of parameter stability among the measured variables and further
supports the validity of the measurement model.
Examining the structural path estimates shown in Figure 5, all but two are
significant, and one is in the wrong direction. The AVE of the PVC model was also
good. As indicated in Table 10, the path estimates for both SMC - à AM and ISE + à
AM are higher than the value for which the p-value less than or equal to α is considered
statistically significant. Consequently, despite the estimates of ISE + à AM is in the
right direction according to the hypothesis, it is not supported. The path for SMC - à
AM is in the wrong direction of the hypothesis and have a p-value that is greater than the

α of a type 1 error of 0.05, the result is not significant, and hence we failed to reject the
hypothesized path. However, on the basis that six of the eight standardized parameter
estimates are consistent with the hypotheses, the theoretical model is supported. This
indicates that the PVC model has good explanatory power, robustness, and ruggedness,
and is influential for both academics and practitioners.

Table 10
Results of the Structural Model Hypotheses Test
Hypothesis (with
Direction)
H1: SMC à AM (-)
H2: PSUS à AM (+)
H3: PSE à AM (+)
H4: ISKS à AM (+)
H5: ISE à AM (+)
H6: GN à AB (+)
H7: SE à AB (+)
H8: AM à AB (+)

Standardized
Parameter
Estimate
0.085
0.143
0.198
0.394
0.113
0.102
0.250
0.597

Standard
Error

t-value

p-value

Supported?

0.120
0.070
0.038
0.051
0.072
0.050
0.044
0.045

1.29
2.18
4.24
8.15
1.51
2.08
4.67
9.48

0.197
0.029
0.000
0.000
0.129
0.037
0.000
0.000

Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
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Figure 5: Results of the PVC Technology Threat Avoidance Structural Model Analysis

Discussion
This study empirically investigated the factors which motivate professional virtual
community members to engage in avoidance motivation against technology threats,
particularly malware. The researcher validates a research model derived from the
substantial features in the technology threat avoidance theory, the involvement theory,
and the social cognitive theory using quantitative survey data. Self-efficacy, perceived
susceptibility, perceived severity, information security knowledge sharing, and group
norms show not only users’ motivation but also their information security avoidance
behavior. Information security avoidance behavior offers a critical role in mitigating the
risk of technology threats (Liang & Xue, 2009). The results of the structural model
testing indicate strong support for a professional virtual community technology threat
avoidance model (PVCTTAM) that contextualizes the integration of the technology
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threat, social cognitive, and involvement theories into the technology threat avoidance
literature.
The findings of the statistical tests showed that the path from perceived
susceptibility (β = 1.43, p = .029), perceive severity (β = 0.198, p = 0.000), information
security knowledge sharing (β = 0.394, p = 0.000), had a significant positive predicting
effect towards avoidance motivation. The results also proved the path from self-efficacy
(β = 0.250, p = 0.000) and group norms (β = 0.102, p = 0.037) had a significant positive
predicting effect on avoidance behavior. The results further indicated that the relationship
between safeguarding measure (β = 0.085, p = 0.197) and avoidance motivation as well
as information security experience (β =0.113, p = 0.129) on avoidance motivation are not
significant, therefore hypotheses H1 and H5 were unsupported. Finally, the results
revealed a strong relationship between avoidance motivation (β = 0.597, p = 0.000) and
avoidance behavior.
The structural model data analysis results indicated that the model accounts for a
significant amount of variance in users’ motivation to avoid IT threats at 37 percent and
50 percent in avoidance (actual) behavior. This study reveals that to motivate
professional virtual community users to avoid technology threats they must be convinced
that there is a security threat, that the threat is severe, and that users have the skills and
ability to engage in information security protection actions. If users do not perceive that a
threat exists, they will not be motivated to act. Also, PVC users are motivated to share
information security threats and solution within the community. This knowledge sharing
process further motivates users to act against information security threats. Furthermore,
this study demonstrates that the group norms of the community also motivate users to
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engage in information security protection behavior. This study also revealed that prior
experience with information security threat did not motivate users to avoid future threats
in a professional virtual environment.
Interestingly, while many IS studies found that both perceived severity and
perceived susceptibility have a significant predicting effect on avoidance motivation, in
this study, information security knowledge sharing (ISKS) was the strongest predictor of
avoidance motivation. While elements of ISKS in the involvement theory posits to
motivate users to take actions, TTAT or other security avoidance theories such as PMT
does not position the construct as a central component of threat avoidance. However, as
the study was conducted in a professional virtual community environment, which
encourages knowledge sharing and where users may have experienced a great deal of
encouragement to adopt security measures, this disclosure factor may have influenced the
data, resulting in the heightened level of information security knowledge sharing on
avoidance motivation.
There was a lack of support for H1 and H5, which examines safeguarding measure
cost and information security experience, respectively. Though not consistent with TTAT
and involvement theories, the results are not unique. According to Janz and Becker
(1984), it is essential to take into account the nature of the cost, when measuring
safeguarding measure cost. In measuring information security experience, the severity of
the experience is an essential factor (Dupuis, Crossler, and Endicott-Popovsky, 2012).
The measures of this study did account for the nature of the cost or the severity of
information security experience.
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Summary
This chapter presents an overview and the findings of the primary data collected
from the survey, and its measurement and structural analysis, using a CFA and SEM
multistep statistical process. Also, the survey validation process, including an expert
panel review and a pilot study was presented. The data and its analysis provide evidence
of the significance of the relationships tested in the model. The internal consistency,
convergent validity, and discriminant validity were established with values for reliability
above 0.70, values for AVE above 0.50, and MSV values were less that AVE.
Three items were eliminated from the model based on the initial reliability and
validity testing results. The refined model was later tested as the CFA measurement
model and the structural model. Both the CFA and the SEM model testing demonstrated
a good fit. The model fit was established based on the chi-square, absolute fit,
incremental fit, and parsimonious fit indices. The final model was then discussed
theoretically based on the literature associated with the constructs of the model. The
PVCTTAM model was accepted as optimal in this study, with empirical evidence of
statistical significance. However, it is understood that this model is not unique and other
statistical significance results could be presented from varying relationships among the
constructs in the model, if analyzed in other scenarios, such as in a different virtual
environment.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Overview
Professional virtual communities have become a conduit for knowledge exchange
and professional opportunities for individuals and organizations. However, empirical
evidence suggests that there is an increase in the number of information security breaches
in recent years. This study investigated the information security behavior of users on
LinkedIn. The core research questions focused on how factors from the TTAT, SCT, and
Involvement theory motivate LinkedIn users to engage in information security avoidance
behavior. Through a self-reported survey, this study established that factors such as selfefficacy, safeguarding measure cost, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity
information sharing, experience, and group norms predict LinkedIn users’ technology
threat avoidance motivation and behavior. These factors were explored in an integrated
PVC model. The structural model presented in Appendix J was accepted as the optimal
(statistically significant) model, after the reliability, validity, CFA measurement,
structural model testing and a comparison of the CFA and the structural model. Other
relationships are also possible to derive model fit and may reveal statistical significance
in future studies.
This chapter presents the conclusions that were derived from this study. The
conclusions are presented through the tests of the research questions and the hypotheses.
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This chapter also presents the implications of the research to the IS body of knowledge
and recommendations for further research.

Reporting on the Hypotheses
The professional virtual community user model tested the following hypotheses:
H1: Safeguarding measure cost to protect against technology threats is negatively
related to avoidance motivation.
H2: Perceived susceptibility of being attacked by malicious technology threats is
positively related to avoidance motivation.
H3: Perceived severity of being attacked by malicious technology threats is
positively related to avoidance motivation.
H4: Information security knowledge sharing is positively related to users’
avoidance motivation.
H5: Information security experience is positively related to users’ avoidance
motivation.
H6: Group norms is positively related to technology threat avoidance behavior.
H7: Self-efficacy to protect against technology threats is positively related to
avoidance behavior.
H8: Avoidance motivation is positively related to avoidance behavior to protect
against technology threats using the safeguard measures.
Regarding hypothesis H1: Safeguarding measure cost to protect against technology
threats is negatively related to avoidance motivation, was not supported. Liang and Xue
(2010) posited that safeguarding measure cost tends to generate barriers to behavior and
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reduce behavioral motivation. Therefore, a user’s motivation to avoid a security threat
must be weighed against the expected cost, as users are less likely to take a safeguarding
measure if the costs outweigh the benefits. This study did not confirm Liang and Xue’s
(2010) theory; however, this study is not unique. Based on the data, it may be interpreted
that users must perceive the cost to undertake security measures as extreme, for it to be a
barrier to avoidance motivation. This study measurement did not account for the severity
of the safeguarding measure cost.
Janz and Becker (1984) argued that users would not be motivated to engage in
security behavior if the cost is too high. Liang and Xue (2009) also supported this
concept in the initial TTAT. They posited that the effects of safeguarding measure cost
are mediated by perceived avoidability. Furthermore, according to Becker (1993), an
individual’s actions are influenced by the perceived cost, compared with perceived
benefits. However, the costs and benefits of alternative options are subjective, as it relates
to the decision-maker. Also, McCarthy (2002) indicated that cost is not always related to
financial factors, as such a decision maker may consider diverse interests such as cultural,
social, psychological, or emotional interests during a cost-benefit analysis. These
mediating factors were omitted from this study and possibly could have affected the
result of the hypothesis.
The second hypothesis in this study H2: Perceived susceptibility of being attacked
by malicious technology threats is positively related to avoidance motivation, was
supported by the data. Several research studies (Aurigemma & Panko, 2012; Giwah,
2018; Humaidi & Balakrishnan, 2015; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2009;
Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng & Xu, 2009;) have proposed perceived susceptibility as a critical
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factor in security behavior. Johnston and Warkentin (2010), highlighted that as an
individual becomes conscious of a threat, he or she will establish an opinion of the
seriousness of the threat and the probability of experiencing the threat. Similarly, Rogers
(1983) established that perceived susceptibility is an important factor that impacts an
individual’s reaction to threats.
The third hypothesis H3: Perceived severity of being attacked by malicious
technology threats is positively related to avoidance motivation, was supported by the
data. The relationship between severity and threat is strongly supported by health
psychology and risk analysis literature and has been growing steadily in the information
systems and security domain. For instance, the health belief model and the protection
motivation theory posit that people are motivated to engage in protective measures if
there is a perceived health threat (Janz & Becker, 1984; Rosenstock, 1974). Similarity, IT
studies such as (Ng et al., 2009; Workman et al., 2008) indicate that perceived
susceptibility affects users’ IT security behavior.
The fourth hypothesis, H4: Information security knowledge sharing is positively
related to users’ avoidance motivation, was supported by this study. While knowledge
sharing has been tested as a construct in IS literature in organizations, it is a relatively
new concept in the context of avoidance motivation in response to user information
security behavior on an individual level. This study supports Tamjidyamcholo and Baba’s
(2014) investigation of the effect of information security knowledge sharing in virtual
communities and its effect on reducing risk. They revealed that a low level of knowledge
sharing in a virtual environment is an important barrier in information security. This
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finding is in line with the results of the study conducted by Arachcilage and Love (2014),
which revealed that users’ knowledge prevents security threats.
The fifth hypothesis, H5: Information security experience is positively related to
users’ avoidance motivation, was not supported. One likely explanation for this finding
might be related to the perceived impact of frequency and correlation with severity of
past experiences (Dupuis, Crossler, & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012). Dupuis et al. (2012)
argued that for past security threat to influence future actions, the user must have
perceived the past threat to have had a significant damaging effect and or the threat must
have occurred more than once. This study did not account for the frequency in which
PVC users may have experienced a technology threat or the severity of the past threat.
The sixth hypothesis, H6: Group norms are positively related to technology threat
avoidance behavior, was supported by the data. This finding is aligned with previous
studies that indicate that group norms in virtual communities have a substantial and
significant predicting effect on group members’ attitudes and behavior (Hogg & Terry,
2000; Terry & Hogg, 1996). Group norms assist in forming the identity of the group and
in shaping users’ acceptance of new ideas and concepts, hence in PVCs, group members
can be influenced to engage in information security avoidance behavior.
The seventh hypothesis, H7: Self-efficacy to protect against technology threats is
positively related to avoidance behavior, was supported. This result is consistent with
Bandura’s (1982, p. 140) proposition that “in any given instance, behavior would be best
predicted by considering both self-efficacy and outcome beliefs.” Also, prior research
indicated that as users’ level of self-efficacy increases, they are more inclined to engage
in IT security behavior (Ng et al., 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008).
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The final hypothesis, H8: Avoidance motivation is positively related to avoidance
behavior to protect against technology threats using the safeguard measures, was
supported. This finding is consistent with cognitive theorists (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980;
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and IS literature (Liang & Xue, 2010; Venkatesh et al., 2003),
who argued that behavioral intention is a strong predictor of actual behavior.

Implications
Professional virtual communities continue to grow in popularity. It signals a
uniqueness in the online environment for innovation and professional exploration.
Members on professional networks create and share in-depth professional profiles
highlighting the current and past work experience, education, and other activities about
their professional lives. Members join professional groups, share endorsements, and
engage in career management. Strategizing privacy management has been presented as a
practical approach to mitigating security breaches in social media (Madden, 2012).
However, as PVCs are driven by information sharing, reducing the potential for sharing
could potentially negatively affect the social environment. This research seeks to
augment and diversify research on user information security behavior in PVCs via the
TTAT, SCT, and involvement theories. This study examines individual users’ technology
threat avoidance in the context of PVCs, as users are susceptible to security breaches.
The results of this study have implications for practice as they appraise the
professional virtual community industry and organizations that the solution to technology
threat avoidance in PVCs should not be based on an individualistic culture, but must be
tackled through an integrated approach. While organizations can and usually develop and
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implement security policies and procedures to regulate employees’ security behavior
(Gordon et al., 2006), individual users without a centralized regulation, engage in
voluntary protective actions and are likely to become easy targets for IT threats.
Self-efficacy skills, information security knowledge sharing, group norms are
essential factors capable of motivating users to engage in security threat avoidance
motivation that can improve the overall security of the community. The findings of this
study provide several important practical implications. Firstly, this study contributes to
the field of information systems by developing an integrated model based on constructs
from well-established theories for explaining user information security behavior in
professional virtual communities. The model adopted aspects of two theories from the
domains of social psychology and marketing and integrated it with a theory from IS
domain.
While technology threats and security breaches in virtual environments continue
to rise, the literature is lacking in theory-based empirical research that explains users’
voluntary IT threat avoidance behavior (Liang & Xue, 2010). Prior studies focus mainly
on users’ behavior in organizational settings where security policies are standardized
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub & Welke, 1998) and where IT users appear to be more
compliant. These studies emphasize the use of information security organizational
policies to coerced employees to engage in security behavior. However, in PVCs, where
technology threat avoidance is voluntary, this method is not practicable. Additionally,
while some studies examine users’ security behavior on social networking sites (SNS),
they mainly focus on privacy and disclosure (Saridakis et al., 2016). This study fills the
gap in the literature by offering an understanding of professional virtual community
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individual users’ technology threat avoidance behavior, through an integrated approach.
This study offers methods for voluntary security avoidance and behavior at the individual
level, in the context of PVCs.
Secondly, this study confirms the predicting effect of perceived severity and
perceived susceptibility and the importance of self-efficacy, information knowledge
sharing, and group norms in technology threat avoidance. PVC users will be motivated to
engage in avoidance behavior if they perceived that there is a risk of being attacked. The
higher the risk, the more likely users will take actions to avoid a technology threat.
Similarly, PVC users with high self-efficacy will be more motivated to engage in
technology threat avoidance behavior. This is significant as there is a need for additional
understandings into threat and efficacy in the information security domain, as suggested
by PMT and FAM (Liang & Xue, 2010).
Thirdly, technology threats can be mitigated by increasing Information security
knowledge sharing in professional virtual communities. While information sharing is a
predominant feature in PVCs, the results reveal that extending information sharing to
include security threats and security solutions will motivate other users to avoid
technology threats as they develop threat awareness, perform a cost-benefit analysis,
increase self-efficacy and ultimately engage in security avoidance behavior. Information
security knowledge security in PVCs not only raises the awareness of treats but
demonstrates the importance of engaging in avoidance behavior. Fourthly, group norms
in professional virtual communities play a significant role in technology threat avoidance
behavior. When PVC users embrace an attitude of threat avoidance, by encouraging
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activities that benefit the security of the community, individual users are more motivated
to engage in avoidance behavior.
Study Limitations
The results of this study need to be construed within the context of the limitations
of the study. First, the population of the study was LinkedIn members. While LinkedIn is
the largest, most popular professional virtual community, it is not the sole one. Studying
a single PVC may affect the generalization of the study. The generalization of the study
may increase by surveying other PVCs. Second, the data were collected via a selfreporting survey. People often believe others are more likely to be attacked by technology
threats than themselves. Also, without direct observation of users’ security actions, as
well as the researcher’s inability to control the study environment, it is uncertain if these
data are accurate or unbiased. The survey may be affected by introspective ability, the
ability of respondents to provide accurate responses to questions, based on their
perception of standards.
Third, while the survey instrument was assessed for reliability and validity, it may
not account for minor differences or the range of perceived skills or perceived threats.
Another limitation is that the study can only measure technology threats that are known
to the PVC users surveyed in this study. Additionally, high intercorrelations among the
measurement items might suggest that the items are “overly redundant and the construct
measured too specific” (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, p. 114). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the
construct perceived severity was .960. This high Cronbach’s Alpha may compromise the
content validity of the instrument, as only a portion of the construct was tested
repeatedly. Finally, with the use of SEM analysis, the case of various modified models
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are possible. Therefore, different researchers may generate different SEM or path
analysis models, even with the same data and the same research model.

Recommendations
This study provides a testable concept that can be further explored. While users in
PVCs engage in voluntary technology threat avoidance on an individual level. Individuals
usually share an extensive amount of information about their past and current employers.
Therefore, these organizations are exposed to as much risk as individual users. Hence,
further studies may examine the impacts of individual users’ information security
behavior on organizations. Further studies may also explore the roles of organizations in
providing training and awareness of technology threats for their employees (individual
users), as well as appropriate security behavior concerning virtual communities.
As group norms is established to be a critical factor for technology threat
avoidance in PVCs, further studies can investigate the impacts of security regulations and
standardized policies and procedures for user security behavior in professional virtual
communities. The role of PVC executives, administrators, and governments in
establishing user security behavior regulations for PVCs might also be a subject for
further research. Additionally, for future studies, survey design and analysis may wish to
include mediating constructs and items regarding the severity of past technology threats
and the range of cost associated with safeguarding measure cost to determine at what
point users believe a cost outweighs the benefits of security behavior.
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Summary
This study addressed the rise in security breaches in professional virtual
communities, while users continue to engage in unsafe computing practices. Previous
studies focus more on understanding the home computer usage and compliance in
organizations, and their associated security risks (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; DangPham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Li & Siponen, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010). While studies
on social networking sites have been done, they focus mainly and users’ privacy and
disclosure concerns, adding to the dearth in the literature of studies on security threats in
PVC, especially at the individual level.
The goal of this study is to validate empirically the avoidance motivation factors
that influence users’ information security behavior in professional virtual communities.
The goal was established after a thorough review of the literature. This study is an
attempt to fill the gap in the literature by investigating user security behavior in PVCs
and how to motivate individual users to engage in technology threats avoidance behavior,
through an integrated approach. To address the goals of the study, eight hypotheses were
formulated and tested. Nine constructs were examined: self-efficacy, safeguarding
measure cost, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, information security
knowledge sharing, information security experience, group norms, avoidance motivation,
and avoidance behavior. The research was able to confirm the factors from the TTAT,
SCT, and involvement theory that motivates users to engage in security avoidance
behavior.
A quantitative method was used to investigate the hypotheses. Data were
collected via a web-based survey from 388 LinkedIn members. The survey was
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constructed by adapting items from previous research. The survey had a total of 42
questions, 36 representing the nine constructs and six demographic questions. Except for
the demographics, all items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale. A panel of
experts validated the survey instrument. The items were modified based on the feedback
of the expert panel. The instrument was reviewed and modified until the experts reached
a consensus on the content. Before conducting the main survey, a small pilot study was
conducted to ensure the validity of the survey (Sekaran, 2003; Zikmund, 1988) and to
detect further errors, process, and feasibility of the main study. Twenty-two LinkedIn
members participated in the pilot study. Minor changes were made to the instrument after
the analysis of the pilot data.
Checkmarket.com hosted the survey. The instrument was distributed via email,
SMS, social media, and QR code to 1285 LinkedIn members. The qualifying factors for
the survey were age and membership. All respondents were older than 18 and had a
LinkedIn account. Three hundred eighty-eight participants responded to the study,
yielding an acceptable response rate of 30% (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Of the 388
respondents, 380 completed the survey.
Before analyzing the data, a pre-analysis screening was performed to detect
abnormalities (Mertler & Vannatta, 2009). The data were checked for missing data,
skewness, and kurtosis. Eight surveys had missing data. Those data were deleted based
on the listwise deletion method. The data were assumed to be missing completely at
random (MCAR). The data were accepted as normal, with no outliers. The data were then
analyzed for composite reliability and validity using Cronbach Alpha’s in IBM SPSS.
Internal consistency and validity were established for all the constructs with a Cronbach
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Alpha above the recommended value of 0.70 (Cronbach, 1951). However, the AVE for
two items was low, SMC4 and GN4 were dropped from the instrument.
The measurement model was then evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis to
explore the relationships among the variables in the model. The maximum likelihood
method in IBM Amos version 25 was used to estimate the models’ parameters. The PVC
model established a good model fit. Modifications were made to the CFA model, based
on the recommended modification indices. Six covariances were established between the
error variance for specified indicators. These relationships increased the overall model fit
of the measurement model by placing fewer restrictions on parameter values by allowing
six error covariances to be freely estimated. The internal reliability, convergent validity,
and discriminant validity of the instrument were assessed. All the constructs
demonstrated results above 0.70, AVE above 0.50, and the AVE exceeds the MSV for
each construct.
The structural model was then assessed using SEM to evaluate the overall and
relative fit of the model and the relationship between the hypothesized paths. All the
measures of the model were reflective, with the direction of the casualty from the latent
construct to the measured items. Seven constructs (self-efficacy, safeguarding measure
cost, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, information security knowledge
sharing, information security experience, and group norms) were identified as exogenous
and two constructs (avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior) as endogenous.
Avoidance motivation operates as both an exogenous (independent) construct and an
endogenous (dependent) construct. The first step with SEM was to test for
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multicollinearity. The analysis revealed a lack of collinearity among the predictors as the
tolerance for all constructs were more significant than 0.20 and the VIF below 3.0.
The analysis of the structural model indicated a good model fit. Model fit was
established using the chi-square, normed chi-square, absolute fit, incremental fit, and
parsimonious fit. All model fit indices were within the acceptable threshold and indicated
goodness-of-fit. The path estimates and R2 for the endogenous variables were also
analyzed. From this analysis, it was noted that all, but two relationships were supported.
One path was not statistically significant at a significance level <0.05, while one
relationship was in the wrong direction. Information security knowledge sharing had the
most significant effect on avoidance motivation. The results also indicate that avoidance
motivation had a substantial predicting effect on avoidance behavior. The coefficient of
determination for the endogenous variables of 87% illustrates a good fit between the
model and the data. The structural model was also compared against the CFA; the model
fit indices between the two models were very close, indicating stability in the model. The
structural model was confirmed as optimal. However, this study acknowledges that other
models and representation of the relationships between the constructs may also yield a
good model fit.
This research study concluded with a discussion of the findings, limitations that
may impact the generalizability of the study, the implications for the IS domain, and
recommendations for further studies.
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Appendix A
Survey on measuring User Information Security Behavior on LinkedIn
NSU Consent to be in a Research Study Entitled
User Information Security Behavior in Professional Virtual Communities:
A Technology Threat Avoidance Approach
Dear Participant:
I am Vivienne Forrester, a doctoral candidate with the College of Engineering and
Computing at Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. I am working
under the supervision of Dr. Ling Wang. For my doctoral research, I am examining user
information security behavior in professional virtual communities (PVCs). For this
study, a PVC refers to LinkedIn. You are being asked to participate in this research study
because you are an adult (18 or older) member of the LinkedIn online social network.
You will be taking a one-time, anonymous online survey. The survey will take
approximately eight minutes to complete.
There is no cost for participation in this study, nor is there any payment. All responses to
the survey are completely anonymous, and the study will not collect any personally
identifiable information. Information provided will be handled confidentially. There are
no foreseeable risks linked with your participating in this study. Participation in the
research is voluntary. You can decide not to participate, and you can exit the survey at
any time.
Completion and return of the survey will indicate your willingness to participate in this
study. If you have questions, you can contact Vivienne Forrester at
fvivienn@mynsu.nova.edu or Dr. Wang at lwang@nova.edu. If you have questions
about the study but want to talk to someone who is not a part of the study, you can call
the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (954) 262-5369
or toll-free at 1-866-499-0790 or email at IRB@nova.edu.
If you have read the above information and voluntarily wish to participate in this
research study, please click the “Start” button below to access the survey.
Sincerely,
Vivienne Forrester
fvivienne@mynsu.nova.edu

Powered by CheckMarket
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General information
1.

2.

Age
¡

18-25 years

¡

26-35 years

¡

36-45 years

¡

46-55 years

¡

56-65 years

¡

Older than 65

Gender:
¡

Male

¡

Female

¡

Other, please specify
............................................................

LinkedIn Expereince
3.

4.

How long have you been using LinkedIn?
¡

Less than 1 year

¡

1 - 2 years

¡

3 - 5 years

¡

Over five years

How often do you use LinkedIn?
¡

Regularly (Daily)

¡

Frequently (At least once per week)

¡

Occasionally (At least once per month)

¡

Seldom (At least once every six months)

¡

Rarely (at least once per year)

¡

Other, please specify
............................................................
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Self-efficacy
*

Please indicate your level of confidence in executing the following tasks.
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All Slightly Somewhat Moderately
Very
Confident Confident Confident Confident Confident
SE1. I can easily enable
security features on
LinkedIn by myself.
SE2. I can correctly
install security software
on my computer.
SE3. I can use different
security software to
protect my information
SE4. I can configure my
web browser security
settings.
SE5. I can easily find
information on how to
secure my profile on
LinkedIn.
Safeguarding Measure Cost

*

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.
1
2
3
Strongly Disagree Neutral
Disagree
SMC1. Enabling security
measures decreases the
convenience afforded by
LinkedIn.
SMC2. Enabling security
features on LinkedIn
would be time-consuming.
SMC3. Complying with
the security requirements
of LinkedIn is
burdensome.
SMC4. Security software
may cause problems to
other programs on my PC.

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree
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Perceived Susceptibility
*

Please indicate the likelihood of being affected by the following security risks.
1
Highly
Unlikely

2
Unlikely

3
Somewhat
Likely

4
Likely

5
Highly
Likely

PSUS1. A malware will
infect my computer by
visiting LinkedIn.
PSUS2. My identity will be
stolen by accessing
LinkedIn.
PSUS3. My data will be
corrupted by visiting
LinkedIn.
PSUS4. My personal
information on LinkedIn
could be misused.
Perceived Severity
*

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.
1
2
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
PSE1. Having my computer
infected by malware through
LinkedIn is a severe problem
for me.
PSE2. Having my online
identity stolen through
LinkedIn is a severe problem
for me.
PSE3. Losing personal data
because of malware through
LinkedIn is a severe problem
for me.
PSE4. Losing organizational
data because of malware
through LinkedIn is a severe
problem for me.

3
Neutral

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree
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Information Security Knowledge Sharing
*

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ISKS1. If I find new security
threats, I will inform
LinkedIn members.
ISKS2. If I find a solution to
security threats, I will share
with LinkedIn members.
ISKS3. Sharing of
information security
knowledge with LinkedIn
members is always
beneficial.
ISKS4. Sharing of
information security
knowledge with LinkedIn
members is always valuable.
Information Security Experience
*

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
ISE1. I have experience with
my data being corrupted by
malware.
ISE2. I have experience with
my identity being stolen
through a cyber-attack.
ISE3. I have experience with
my computer being infected
with malware.
ISE4. I have experience with
my personal data being
misused through a cyberattack.

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree
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Group Norms
*

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
1
2
Strongly Disagree
Disagree

3
Neutral

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

GN1. Members encourage
action that benefit the
security of LinkedIn.
GN2. Members engage in
activities that benefit the
security of LinkedIn.
GN3. Members take actions
that avoid threats to the
security of LinkedIn.
GN4. Members are opposed
to activities that may harm
the security of LinkedIn.
Avoidance Motivation
*

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
1
Strongly
Disagree
AM1. I intend to use
security software to avoid
malware on LinkedIn.
AM2. I plan to use security
software to avoid malware
on LinkedIn.
AM3. I will add additional
security measures to protect
my information on LinkedIn.

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree
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Avoidance Behavior
*

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
AB1. I update my computer’s
security software regularly.
AB2. I look for a security
icon, trust mark, or HTTPS to
verify that LinkedIn is secure
before logging on.
AB3. I have changed the
security settings on my
computer that pertain to
LinkedIn access.
AB4. I add additional security
software on my computer to
mitigate impacts of
information security breaches
on LinkedIn.
General Information

*

*

Ethnicity
¡
American Indian or Alaskan Native
¡

Asian

¡

Black or African American

¡

Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander

¡

White

¡

Multiple races

¡

Other, please specify
............................................................

Highest level of education completed:
¡
Less than a high school diploma
¡

High school diploma or equivalent

¡

Some College but no degree

¡

Associate degree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

106
¡

Bachelor degree

¡

Graduate degree

¡

Other, please specify
............................................................

Thank you for taking the time to complete the survey. Your answers are important for us
and provide valuable input for the evaluation and further development of a PVC
Information Security Model.
Please share the survey with your LinkedIn connections by clicking the LinkedIn button
below!

Facebook:
Twitter:
LinkedIn:
WhatsApp:
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Appendix B
Intuitional Review Board Approval Memo
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Appendix C
Expert Panel Review Survey Evaluation
Survey on measuring user information security behavior in a professional virtual
community (PVC): LinkedIn --- (Olson, 2010)
Instructions to Experts
Please evaluate the survey based on the evaluation standards. Also, analyze each question
for the characteristics of burdensome, sensitivity, and potential failures of the response
process.
For each question, analyze whether the characteristic measured in the question is:
a. Burdensome—requires a great deal of cognitive work by the respondent (yes,
no).
b. Sensitive—requires revealing embarrassing or private information or the topic
is not discussed in everyday conversation (yes, no).
c. Potential failures of the response process - whether a failure of the response
process is likely to occur at any stage. If any failure is likely to occur, please
rate how likely a failure at each stage in the response process is to occur.
0 = Unlikely that a failure of this stage will occur
1 = Somewhat likely that a failure of this stage will occur
2 = Likely that a failure of this stage will occur
3 = Very likely that a failure of this stage will occur
Overall Survey Evaluation Standards
1

Are the questions asking about the right things?

2

Are the response sets reasonable?

3

Content:

4
5

Cognitive:

6

Usability:

7

Structure:

Yes

No

Is the wording technically correct and
appropriate?
Will all questions be understood in the same way
by all respondents?
Does this understanding match the intended
purpose of the survey designer?
Can respondents complete the survey easily and
as they were intended?
Does the survey flow logically?

Comments, concerns, recommendations:
You may make notes for only the questions you answered YES in any of the categories
and any specifics relating to the evaluation standards.
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Appendix D
Pre-analysis testing with descriptive statistics, skewness, and kurtosis

SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SMC1
SMC2
SMC3
SMC4
PSUS1
PSUS2
PSUS3
PSUS4
PSE1
PSE2
PSE3
PSE4
ISKS1
ISKS2
ISKS3
ISKS4
ISE1
ISE2
ISE3
ISE4
GN1
GN2
GN3
GN4
AM1
AM2
AM3

N
Statistic
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380
380

Mean
Std. Deviation
Skewness
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic Std. Error
3.461
1.2225
-.422
.125
3.732
1.3062
-.714
.125
3.421
1.3163
-.421
.125
3.542
1.2896
-.487
.125
3.555
1.2326
-.404
.125
2.903
.8947
.015
.125
2.884
.9866
.151
.125
2.639
.9354
.348
.125
2.924
1.0461
-.014
.125
2.384
1.1087
.773
.125
2.550
1.0066
.416
.125
2.232
1.0035
.940
.125
3.142
1.0754
.111
.125
3.516
1.4038
-.521
.125
3.787
1.4177
-.819
.125
3.618
1.3913
-.624
.125
3.532
1.4092
-.545
.125
3.703
1.0032
-.811
.125
3.713
.9823
-.860
.125
3.900
.8930
-.942
.125
3.905
.9424
-1.046
.125
2.850
1.3883
.146
.125
2.234
1.2026
.849
.125
3.247
1.3848
-.445
.125
2.447
1.2686
.579
.125
3.347
.8124
-.003
.125
3.300
.7854
-.091
.125
3.279
.8258
-.021
.125
3.437
.8274
-.036
.125
3.642
1.0418
-.509
.125
3.589
1.0375
-.397
.125
3.616
1.0272
-.439
.125

Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error
-.690
.250
-.703
.250
-.924
.250
-.830
.250
-.867
.250
-.099
.250
-.518
.250
-.142
.250
-.677
.250
.052
.250
-.291
.250
.515
.250
-.637
.250
-1.048
.250
-.762
.250
-.946
.250
-1.044
.250
.402
.250
.549
.250
1.355
.250
1.356
.250
-1.364
.250
-.320
.250
-1.188
.250
-.783
.250
.460
.250
.883
.250
.516
.250
.125
.250
-.304
.250
-.382
.250
-.343
.250
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AB1
AB2
AB3
AB4
Valid N
(listwise)

380
380
380
380
380

3.668
3.629
2.876
3.024

1.1256
1.1766
1.1704
1.2142

-.637
-.468
.371
.186

.125
.125
.125
.125

-.482
-.929
-.829
-1.020

.250
.250
.250
.250
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Appendix E
Scale Reliability Analysis
Table E1: Reliability analysis of the scale of Self-efficacy (SE)

SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5

Cronbach's Alpha
.902
Scale
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item Deleted Item Deleted
14.250
20.125
13.979
18.775
14.289
18.465
14.168
18.695
14.155
19.477

N of Items
5
Corrected
Cronbach's
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.686
.895
.765
.878
.791
.872
.788
.873
.749
.882

Table E2: Reliability analysis of the scale of safeguard measure cost (SMC)
Cronbach's Alpha
N of Items
.769
4
Scale
Corrected
Cronbach's
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted
SMC1
8.447
5.689
.552
.724
SMC2
8.466
5.020
.645
.672
SMC3
8.711
5.256
.633
.681
SMC4
8.426
5.469
.466
.774
Table E3: Reliability analysis of the scale of Perceived Susceptibility (PSUS)
Cronbach's Alpha
.870

PSUS1
PSUS2
PSUS3
PSUS4

Scale Mean if Scale Variance
Item Deleted if Item Deleted
7.924
7.121
7.758
7.382
8.076
7.364
7.166
7.896

N of Items
4
Corrected
Cronbach's
Item-Total
Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.731
.831
.783
.811
.791
.808
.600
.883
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Table E4: Reliability analysis of the scale of perceived severity (PSE)

PSE1
PSE2
PSE3
PSE4

Cronbach's Alpha
.960
Scale
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item Deleted Item Deleted
10.937
16.339
10.666
15.859
10.834
15.917
10.921
16.157

N of Items
4
Corrected
Cronbach's
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.870
.955
.914
.943
.931
.938
.886
.951

Table E5: Reliability analysis of the scale of Information security knowledge sharing
(ISKS)

ISKS1
ISKS2
ISKS3
ISKS4

Cronbach's Alpha
.902
Scale
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item Deleted Item Deleted
11.518
6.351
11.508
6.398
11.321
6.831
11.316
6.702

N of Items
4
Corrected
Cronbach's
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.782
.874
.795
.869
.789
.872
.763
.880

Table E6: Reliability analysis of the scale of information security experience
Cronbach's Alpha
N of Items
.830
4
Scale
Corrected
Cronbach's
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted
ISE1
7.929
10.330
.674
.778
ISE2
8.545
11.790
.610
.806
ISE3
7.532
10.429
.663
.783
ISE4
8.332
10.898
.688
.772
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Table E7: Reliability analysis of the scale of Group Norms (GN)
Cronbach's Alpha
N of Items
.815
4
Scale
Corrected
Cronbach's
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted
GN1
10.016
3.868
.710
.731
GN2
10.063
3.817
.770
.704
GN3
10.084
4.025
.631
.769
GN4
9.926
4.528
.450
.851
Table E8: Reliability analysis of the scale of Avoidance motivation (AM)
Cronbach's Alpha
N of Items
.926
3
Scale
Corrected
Cronbach's
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted
AM1
7.205
3.778
.875
.872
AM2
7.258
3.680
.918
.837
AM3
7.232
4.168
.760
.963
Table E9: Reliability analysis of the scale of avoidance behavior (AB)
Cronbach's Alpha
N of Items
.811
4
Scale
Corrected
Cronbach's
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted
AB1
9.529
9.020
.554
.797
AB2
9.568
8.494
.606
.774
AB3
10.321
8.150
.675
.741
AB4
10.174
7.896
.683
.736
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Table E10: Reliability analysis of the scale user information security behavior on
LinkedIn

AB1
AB2
AB3
AB4
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SMC1
SMC2
SMC3
SMC4
PSUS1
PSUS2
PSUS3
PSUS4
PSE1
PSE2
PSE3
PSE4
ISKS1
ISKS2
ISKS3
ISKS4
ISE1
ISE2
ISE3
ISE4
GN1
GN2

Cronbach's Alpha
.908
Scale
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item Deleted Item Deleted
113.561
371.429
113.600
368.030
114.353
365.859
114.205
364.607
113.768
376.258
113.497
373.164
113.808
369.507
113.687
373.086
113.674
374.337
114.326
379.656
114.345
380.411
114.589
379.562
114.305
378.112
114.845
369.620
114.679
373.005
114.997
373.749
114.087
374.813
113.713
365.561
113.442
365.825
113.611
365.521
113.697
365.784
113.526
376.398
113.516
377.533
113.329
376.417
113.324
374.383
114.379
366.948
114.995
375.514
113.982
368.963
114.782
369.965
113.882
379.070
113.929
379.607

N of Items
36
Corrected
Cronbach's
Item-Total Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.474
.905
.528
.904
.581
.904
.586
.903
.327
.907
.364
.907
.435
.906
.371
.907
.365
.907
.367
.907
.308
.907
.351
.907
.345
.907
.525
.904
.494
.905
.476
.905
.415
.906
.479
.905
.469
.905
.485
.905
.473
.905
.407
.906
.386
.906
.463
.906
.493
.905
.458
.906
.349
.907
.420
.906
.444
.906
.427
.906
.425
.906
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GN3
GN4
AM1
AM2
AM3

113.950
113.792
113.587
113.639
113.613

378.749
382.281
366.665
366.384
369.568

.430
.318
.639
.649
.573

.906
.907
.903
.903
.904
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Appendix F
Convergent and Discriminant Validity

Constructs

AVE

MSV

AM

SE

SMC

PSUS

PSE

AM
SE

0.823
0.648

0.457
0.203

0.907
0.244

0.805

SMC

0.473

0.297

0.223

0.066

0.688

PSUS

0.641

0.300

0.379

-0.016

0.496

0.801

PSE

0.857

0.128

0.358

0.042

0.211

0.309

0.926

ISKS
ISE
GN
AB

0.686
0.552
0.567
0.525

0.220
0.300
0.175
0.457

0.469
0.296
0.393
0.676

0.266
0.113
0.283
0.450

0.054
0.545
0.172
0.271

0.234
0.548
0.198
0.442

0.241
0.225
0.121
0.280

ISKS

ISE

GN

AB

0.828
0.132
0.382
0.363

0.743
0.165
0.368

0.753
0.418

0.725
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Appendix G
Measuement Theory Model for Professional Virtual Community Technology
Threat Avoidance Model (PVCTTAM)
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Appendix H
CFA Model Fit Summary
Model Fit Summary
CMIN
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

NPAR
108
561
33

CMIN
868.096
.000
9700.910

DF
453
0
528

P
.000

CMIN/DF
1.916

.000

18.373

RMR, GFI
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

RMR
.070
.000
.377

GFI
.878
1.000
.272

AGFI
.849

PGFI
.709

.226

.256

NFI
Delta1
.911
1.000
.000

RFI
rho1
.896

IFI
Delta2
.955
1.000
.000

TLI
rho2
.947

Baseline Comparisons
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

.000

.000

Parsimony-Adjusted Measures
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

PRATIO
.858
.000
1.000

PNFI
.781
.000
.000

PCFI
.819
.000
.000

NCP
415.096
.000
9172.910

LO 90
335.635
.000
8856.543

NCP
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

HI 90
502.354
.000
9495.674

CFI
.955
1.000
.000
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FMIN
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

FMIN
2.290
.000
25.596

F0
1.095
.000
24.203

LO 90
.886
.000
23.368

HI 90
1.325
.000
25.055

RMSEA
Model
Default model
Independence model

RMSEA
.049
.214

LO 90
.044
.210

HI 90
.054
.218

PCLOSE
.602
.000

AIC
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

AIC
1084.096
1122.000
9766.910

BCC
1105.383
1232.574
9773.414

BIC
1509.634
3332.436
9896.936

CAIC
1617.634
3893.436
9929.936

ECVI
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

ECVI
2.860
2.960
25.770

LO 90
2.651
2.960
24.935

HI 90
3.091
2.960
26.622

HOELTER
Model
Default model
Independence model

HOELTER
.05
220
23

HOELTER
.01
230
24

MECVI
2.917
3.252
25.787
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Appendix I
Measurement Model Validation during CFA

CR

AVE

MSV

AB

SE

PSE

ISKS

PSUS

ISE

GN

SMC

AB

0.806

0.585

0.446

0.765

SE

0.893

0.626

0.162

0.403

0.792

PSE

0.956

0.846

0.127

0.282

0.037

0.920

ISKS

0.881

0.656

0.211

0.348

0.168

0.191

0.810

PSUS

0.867

0.626

0.269

0.476

-0.028

0.291

0.206

0.791

ISE

0.813

0.525

0.283

0.361

0.081

0.200

0.068

0.519

0.725

GN

0.868

0.692

0.146

0.382

0.268

0.115

0.361

0.198

0.154

0.832

SMC

0.776

0.540

0.283

0.282

0.071

0.194

-0.066

0.465

0.532

0.150

0.735

AM

0.932

0.823

0.446

0.668

0.230

0.357

0.459

0.382

0.290

0.379

0.217

AM

0.907
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Appendix J
Structural Model for Professional Virtual Community Technology Threat
Avoidance Model (PVCTTAM)

122

Appendix K
Model Fit Summary for Structural Model

Model Fit Summary
CMIN
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

NPAR
103
561
33

CMIN
915.130
.000
9700.910

DF
458
0
528

P
.000

CMIN/DF
1.998

.000

18.373

RMR, GFI
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

RMR
.079
.000
.377

GFI
.874
1.000
.272

AGFI
.846

PGFI
.714

.226

.256

NFI
Delta1
.906
1.000
.000

RFI
rho1
.891

IFI
Delta2
.951
1.000
.000

TLI
rho2
.943

Baseline Comparisons
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

.000

.000

Parsimony-Adjusted Measures
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

PRATIO
.867
.000
1.000

PNFI
.786
.000
.000

PCFI
.824
.000
.000

NCP
457.130
.000
9172.910

LO 90
374.814
.000
8856.543

NCP
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

HI 90
547.220
.000
9495.674

CFI
.950
1.000
.000
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FMIN
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

FMIN
2.415
.000
25.596

F0
1.206
.000
24.203

LO 90
.989
.000
23.368

HI 90
1.444
.000
25.055

RMSEA
Model
Default model
Independence model

RMSEA
.051
.214

LO 90
.046
.210

HI 90
.056
.218

PCLOSE
.321
.000

AIC
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

AIC
1121.130
1122.000
9766.910

BCC
1141.432
1232.574
9773.414

BIC
1526.968
3332.436
9896.936

CAIC
1629.968
3893.436
9929.936

ECVI
Model
Default model
Saturated model
Independence model

ECVI
2.958
2.960
25.770

LO 90
2.741
2.960
24.935

HI 90
3.196
2.960
26.622

HOELTER
Model
Default model
Independence model

HOELTER
.05
211
23

HOELTER
.01
221
24

MECVI
3.012
3.252
25.787
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Appendix L
Comparison of CFA and Structural Model Fit.

Metric
Indices

Acceptable
value
915.130
458

Structural
Model Fit

Chisquare/df

≤ 3.00

1.998

868.096
453
0.000
1.916

RMSEA

≤ 0.06

0.051

0.491

RMR
SRMR

≤ 1.00
≤ 0.08

0.075
0.654

0.070
0.654

Incremental
Fit Indices

CFI
NFI
IFI

≥ 0.95
≥ 0.90
≥ 0.90

0.950
0.906
0.951

0.955
0.911
0.955

Parsimony
Fit Indices

AGFI

≥ 0.80

0.874

0.849

Chi-square
(χ2)

Absolute Fit
Measures

CFA Model
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Appendix M
Comparison of CFA and Structural Model Factor Loadings
Constructs
Self-Efficacy (SE)

Items

SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
Safeguarding Measure SMC1
Cost (SMC)
SMC2
SMC3
Perceived
PSU1
Susceptibility
PSU2
(PSUS)
PSU3
PSU4
Perceived Severity
PSE1
(PSE)
PSE2
PSE3
PSE4
Information Security ISKS1
Knowledge Sharing
ISKS2
(ISKS)
ISKS3
ISKS4
Information Security ISE1
Experience (ISE)
ISE2
ISE3
ISE4
Group Norms (GN)
GN1
GN2
GN3
Avoidance Motivation AM1
(AM)
AM2
AM3
AB2
Avoidance Behavior
AB3
(AB)
AB4

CFA Factor
Loadings
.700
.786
.809
.870
.784
.601
.775
.812
.845
.798
.893
.583
.866
.908
.974
.927
.925
.931
.683
.641
.649
.732
.741
.856
.849
.958
.661
.938
.989
.781
.613
.824
.836

Structural
Model
.700
.784
.804
.872
787
.600
.772
.815
.824
.823
.867
.611
.866
.908
.974
.927
.925
.930
.685
.661
.728
.633
.700
.756
.846
.961
.659
.940
.986
.783
.606
.815
.830
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